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DEAR IRS, IT IS TIME TO ENFORCE THE
CAMPAIGNING PROHIBITION.
EVEN AGAINST CHURCHES
SAMUEL D. BRUNSON*
In 1954, Congress prohibited tax-exempt public charities,
including churches, from endorsing or opposing candidates
for office. To the extent a tax-exempt public charity violated
this prohibition, it would no longer qualify as tax-exempt,
and the IRS was to revoke its exemption.
While simple in theory, in practice, the IRS rarely penalizes
churches that violate the campaigning prohibition and
virtually never revokes a church's tax exemption. And,
because no taxpayer has standing to challenge the IRS's
inaction, the IRS has no external imperative to revoke the
exemptions of churches that do campaign on behalf of or
against candidatesfor office.
This Article makes the normative case that, notwithstanding
the IRS's administrative discretion and the inability of
taxpayers to challenge its nonenforcement in court, the time
has come for the IRS to begin enforcing the campaigning
prohibition. Failing to do so harms the rule of law, the
taxpaying public, and churches themselves. Moreover, the
moment is correct for enforcement, as the difficulty and cost
of finding violations has fallen dramatically over the last
several years. People are more aware than ever that churches
are violating the prohibition, and, in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court's Citizens United decision, the campaigning
prohibition may represent the final regulatory barrier
between charitiesand politicking.

* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I
would like to thank John M. Breen, Philip T. Hackney, David Herzig, Jeffrey L.
Kwall, Benjamin Leff, Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Alexander Tsesis, and Spencer Weber
Waller for their thoughtful comments on the article. I would also like to thank the
participants in the faculty presentation at Loyola University Chicago. I would like
to thank Jamie Brunson for her support.
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Even if enforcing the campaigningprohibition is the right
thing to do, it would potentially be unpopular and could
provoke a backlash against the IRS. After making the
normative case for enforcement, this Article provides a
strategy for enforcement that will allow the IRS to explain
what it is doing and why to the general taxpaying public,
and will further permit the IRS to avoid the appearanceof
partisanship. Ultimately, enforcement will allow the IRS to
responsibly administer the tax law, permit the question of
the prohibition's constitutionality to get in front of the
judiciary, and demonstrate dedication to the rule of law.
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INTRODUCTION

About a month before the 2016 presidential election, some
church-goers will participate-actively or passively-in a
protest against the tax law. In addition to religious messages,
some pastors will explicitly endorse one of the presidential
candidates, in violation of the tax law's campaigning
prohibition, but, they will argue, in accordance with their First
Amendment rights to free speech and exercise. Since 2008, the
Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF)' has endorsed "Pulpit
Freedom Sunday," encouraging pastors to flout the Internal
Revenue Code's (IRC or Code) campaigning prohibition. 2 And,
while only thirty-three pastors participated in the first Pulpit
Freedom Sunday, more than 1,500 pastors participated in
advance of the 2012 presidential election. 3
The ADF's ultimate goal in organizing Pulpit Freedom
Sunday is to challenge the constitutionality of the campaigning
prohibition in court.4 To get to court, though, it needs the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to enforce the prohibition and
penalize a church for making such an endorsement. 5 The ADF
does not want to rely on the IRS's ability to discover violative
sermons to move forward. Instead, to aid the IRS in its
enforcement, the ADF encourages pastors to send copies of
their Pulpit Freedom Sunday sermons directly to the IRS. 6
1. The ADF is an advocacy and legal organization that works to defend
people's "right ... to freely live out their faith." About Us, ALLIANCE DEFENDING
FREEDOM, http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/about [http://perma.cc/649NKRUC].
2. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
3. David Skeel, Politicking from the Pulpit and the Tax Man, WALL STREET
J. (Nov. 22, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873237131045781
33181817762710 [http://perma.cc/R949-653E].
4. The ADF claims that it hopes, as a result of Pulpit Freedom Sunday, "to
eventually go to court to have the Johnson Amendment struck down as
unconstitutional."
Pulpit Freedom Sunday vs. IRS, ALLIANCE DEFENDING
FREEDOM
(Oct.
2,
2014),
http://www.adfmedia.org/News/PRDetail/9333
[http://perma.cc/5HJZ-L754]. Its stated desire may be pretextual, however: if it
really wanted to challenge the constitutionality of the prohibition, it has other
means. It could, for example, recruit a church to file an application for exemption
with the IRS that revealed that the church qualified for exemption, except that it
intended to endorse candidates for office. To get to court, though, the church
would still need the IRS to reject the application. If the IRS did, the church could
challenge the constitutionality of the prohibition in court.
5. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
6. Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities:Using an Intermediate Penalty
to Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 150-51 (2011)
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But, even after eight years of pastors blatantly violating
the campaigning prohibition, the IRS has done nothing to
penalize these churches. 7 Because the campaigning prohibition
is a qualification requirement for exemption, 8 such blatant
violations by these pastors should result in a loss of their
churches' tax exemption. Yet in spite of the widespread
publicity and easy discovery (in the form of mailed sermons) of
violation, the IRS has not disqualified a single Pulpit Freedom
Sunday participant for violating the campaigning prohibition. 9
There are many possible reasons why the IRS has not
enforced the campaigning prohibition against the Pulpit
Freedom Sunday churches. While this Article will briefly lay
out some of them,1 0 why is not the focus of the Article. Instead,
this Article will argue that, as a normative matter, the IRS
should disqualify churches that violate the campaigning
prohibition." Specifically, the IRS should disqualify every
("[Blecause the pastors intended their sermons as a challenge to the prohibition,
they sent copies of their sermons to the IRS.").
7. See Josh Hicks, PoliticalPastors Openly Defying IRS Rules on Candidate
Endorsements, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.comiblogs/
federal-eye/wp/2014/11/04/political-pastors-defying-irs-rules-on-candidateendorsements [http://perma.cclRDE9-QE58].
8. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (prohibiting would-be public charities from
"participat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in, (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office").
9. In fact, it appears that the IRS has only ever disqualified one church as a
result of violating the campaigning prohibition, and that happened in 1992.

Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). It also disqualified
Christian Echoes as a result of Christian Echoes' significant campaigning
activities, which were motivated by sincere religious conviction. Christian Echoes

Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1972). Still,
Christian Echoes had received its exemption as a religious and educational
organization, not as a church. Id. at 852.
10. See infra Section IV.A.
11. The IRS has settled a lawsuit with the Freedom From Religion
Foundation agreeing to "eventually take action" against churches that violate the
campaigning prohibition. Rachael Bade, Rogue Pastors Endorse Candidates, but
IRS Looks Away, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2014, 5:04 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/
2014/11/2014-elections-pastors-endorsing-candidates-irs-1 12434.html
[http://
perma.cc/FTV5-T3LA]. Even if the IRS follows through, though, it is not clear
what would constitute taking action. In addition, agreement or not, it will face the
same types of opposition in the future as it has in the past as it attempts to
enforce the campaigning prohibition. This Article will argue that the IRS should
make a real effort to enforce the campaigning prohibition out of an interest in
protecting the tax law and benefiting churches themselves, not a half-hearted
effort motivated merely by meeting its obligation. In addition to the normative
arguments for engaging in real enforcement, this Article will describe a series of
strategies that the IRS can use to shield itself from accusations of bias and more
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church that participates in Pulpit Freedom Sunday and sends a
copy of a sermon that endorses or opposes a candidate for
public office to the IRS.
Churches are stuck in limbo until the IRS enforces the
campaigning prohibition against churches, knowing both that
the IRS does not enforce the prohibition, but that it could. 12
Without a judicial determination of its constitutionality,
moreover, churches may be circumscribing their speech more
than they need to or may be violating a permissible law. 13
effectively enforce the campaigning prohibition.
12. Churches generally should be aware of the campaigning prohibition.
National media report on it extensively. See, e.g., id. ("A record number of rogue
Christian pastors are endorsing candidates from the pulpit this election cycle,
using Sunday sermons to defiantly flout tax rules."); Jim Dwyer, Priest'sDip into
Politics Raises Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
09/19/nyregion/romney-endorsement-in-church-bulletin-raises-outry.html? r=1
[http://perma.cc/29KZ-H4SP]
("Tax-exempt organizations like churches are
'absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening
in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
elective public office,' according to I.R.S. guidelines."); No Word from I.R.S. on
Protest by Pastors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
04/26/us/politics/26churches.html [http://perma.cc/3KU7-TY4B] ("Churches that
violate the [no-campaigning] rule can lose their tax-exempt status."); Paul Vitello,
Pastors'Web ElectioneeringAttracts U.S. Reviews of Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/03/nyregion/03irs.html?page
wanted=all [http://perma.cc/8CP6-L9C4] ("The I.R.S., which can revoke the tax
exemptions of churches that express support or opposition to candidates for public
office, has declined to say whether it is reviewing Mr. Manning's case."). In
addition, the IRS provides clear guidance for churches. On its website, the IRS
informs public charities that they "are absolutely prohibited from directly or
indirectly participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for elective public office." The Restriction of
Political Campaign Intervention by Section 501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Organizations,
IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/TheRestriction-of-Political-Campaign-Intervention-by-Section-501%28c%29%283%29Tax-Exempt-Organizations [http://perma.cc/F53M-2Q7H]. The IRS also provides a
publication directed specifically at churches that explains the prohibition and
warns churches that "[v]iolation of this prohibition may result in denial or
revocation of tax-exempt status and the imposition of certain excise tax." I.R.S.,
TAx GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 7 (2013),
http://www.irs.gov/publirs-pdflpl828.pdf [http://perma.cc/GN5M-JZQA].
13. For example, under its current policies, the Mormon church does not
"[e]ndorse, promote or oppose political parties, candidates or platforms." The
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Political Neutrality, MORMON
NEWSROOM,
http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/official-statement/politicalneutrality [http://perma.cc/3Z5V-MDRT]. If this policy is founded on complying
with the campaigning prohibition, and the campaigning prohibition is
unconstitutional, then the Mormon church is acting in a manner more
circumscribed than it needs to. At the opposite extreme, if the prohibition is
constitutionally permissible, pastors such as Rev. Mark Cowart, who endorsed
Bob Beauprez for Colorado governor in 2014, are violating a permissible
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Unless and until the prohibition's constitutionality as applied
to churches can get in front of the courts, they cannot know the
permissible limits on their actions. 14 And the only way the
constitutionality of the campaigning prohibition can get in
front of the courts is if the IRS chooses to revoke a church's tax
exemption, which will provide the church with standing to
challenge the prohibition in court.1 5
Determining the constitutionality of the campaigning
prohibition is more than just an academic exercise: the
prohibition affects the real-world activities of churches, even as
they do not know its constitutional status. 16 On a regular basis,
churches must weigh what they wish to say against the
consequences of saying it. While many churches have no desire
to endorse or oppose specific candidates for office, 17 some view
endorsing or opposing certain candidates as part of their moral
duty.1 8 The campaigning prohibition imposes a cost-that is,
the risk of losing their tax exemption-on churches in deciding
whether to follow their moral duty. Because a church cannot
know whether that cost is constitutionally permissible,

law. Bade, supra note 11.
14. It is worth noting that, while the campaigning prohibition also applies to
non-church public charities, such charities generally do not challenge its
constitutionality. Churches make the specific argument that the prohibition
violates their free exercise rights under the First Amendment. See Roger
Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens United: A
Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 699 (2012) ("There has been
considerable scholarship addressing whether the Rule should be relaxed for
[churches], and whether the Rule could withstand a constitutional challenge
under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.").
15. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
16. See Tamara Audi, PreachingPolitics, PastorsDefy Ban, WALL STREET J.
(Oct. 5, 2014, 9:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/preaching-politics-pastorsdefy-ban-1412558726 [http://perma.cc/AM2P-FFMY] ("But some church leaders
have complained the regulation is unclear and say 'vague and unequal
enforcement' has led to pastors pulling back on social commentary that could be
construed as political, said Kerri Kupec, a spokeswoman for the Alliance
Defending Freedom.").
17. Church endorsement of candidates for office can be off-putting to
congregants; according to a Pew study, fully two-thirds of Americans oppose
churches endorsing candidates for office. Americans Wary of Church Involvement
in PartisanPolitics, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.pewforum.org/2008/
[http://perma.
10/01/americans-wary-of-church-involvement-in-partisan-politics/

cc/SV2L-AYEN].
18. For example, Rev. Cowart argued that he was endorsing one candidate
because that candidate "is against more gun control, does not support abortion
and he does protect the man-woman marriage-that's the one I'm voting for . ...
I'm endorsing biblical principles." Bade, supra note 11. (alteration in original).
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however, it cannot accurately weigh the costs against the
benefits. Until the IRS enforces the prohibition, and the courts
definitively rule on the constitutionality of the campaigning
prohibition, churches that feel a calling to act in the political
sphere must act without knowing whether the campaigning
prohibition is constitutional or not.
Although people colloquially say that it is against the law
for a church or other tax-exempt organization to endorse or
oppose candidates for office, it is important to point out such a
colloquialism
misstates
the
impediments
tax-exempt
organizations face in endorsing candidates. A church's support
of a candidate does not violate any law; it merely violates the
criteria laid out for an organization to qualify as tax-exempt.
As long as a church is indifferent to its exempt status, it can
freely and without impediment endorse or oppose candidates
for office. 19
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will discuss the
tax exemption available to public charities under I.R.C.
section 501(c)(3). It will lay out both the economic benefits that
accrue to these exempt public charities, and the certain
limitations placed on them, including the campaigning
prohibition. Finally, it will discuss the penalties the
government may impose on public charities for violating the
campaigning prohibition.
Part
II
will
explore
administrative
discretion.
Administrative discretion recognizes that administrative
agencies are often in the best position to determine whether
and how to enforce the law and grants those agencies broad
(though not limitless) discretion in choosing not to enforce
certain laws. Part II will also look at a second level of
insulation that the IRS enjoys against being forced to act:
taxpayers lack standing to challenge its nonenforcement
decisions.
After acknowledging the IRS's ability and right to choose
not to enforce the campaigning prohibition, Part III will lay out
a normative and a pragmatic case for the IRS's choosing to
enforce the prohibition anyway. It will look at the effects on the
rule of law of failing to enforce the prohibition, but will also
look at enforcement's effects on the public's perception of
19. See Michael Hatfield, Ignore the Rumors-Campaigningfrom the Pulpit Is
Okay: Thinking Past the Symbolism of Section 501(c)(3), 20 NOTRE DAME J. L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 125, 128-29 (2006).
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churches and on the IRS itself.
Part IV will discuss the effects on churches of losing their
tax exemption. In its publicity materials, the ADF alleges that
such a loss will not impact churches, 2 0 and the IRS has
expressed agreement with that idea. 2 1 Both the ADF and the
IRS are wrong. Although the financial impact to churches of
losing their exemptions may be minimal, the loss of exemption
will nonetheless be significant. As Part IV will point out, loss of
exemption will probably have little economic impact: the
immediate economic effects on churches and on their donors
are likely to be marginal. Still, noneconomic effects of losing a
tax exemption, including the administrative burden of
requalifying and the reputational harms associated with the
loss of exemption are likely to exceed what churches expect.
Finally, Part V will provide the IRS with a blueprint of
how it can reasonably provide churches with standing to put
the question of the prohibition's constitutionality in front of the
courts. If we expect the IRS to enforce the campaigning
prohibition, it must have a strategic plan for how to enforce it.
Although the IRS will benefit from enforcing the prohibition,
the majority of the benefits accrue to others while the IRS
bears the majority of the costs. 22 If the IRS acts strategically

and engages the public in a thoughtful way, it can reduce its
costs of revoking church exemptions and allow the courts to
rule on the prohibition's constitutionality. Ultimately, the IRS
serves as the gateway to judicial review, and only the IRS's
actions can allow the judiciary to rule on whether the tax law
can constitutionally prevent churches from campaigning.
20. See, e.g., Pulpit Freedom Sunday Frequently Asked Questions, ALLIANCE
DEFENDING
FREEDOM,
3,
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ChurchFAQPulpit
Freedom.pdf [http://perma.cc/7FDR-J6KB] [hereinafter Pulpit Freedom Sunday
FAQ] ("Alliance Defending Freedom believes that a church may only lose its tax
exempt status for a very short time period, and even if a church's tax exempt
501(c)(3) letter is revoked, a church may once again be automatically considered
tax exempt under the tax code if it agrees to abide by section 501(c)(3).").
21. Branch Ministries v. Rissotti, 211 F.3d 137, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("As
the IRS confirmed at oral argument, if the Church does not intervene in future
political campaigns, it may hold itself out as a 501(c)(3) organization and receive
all the benefits of that status. All that will have been lost, in that event, is the
advance assurance of deductibility in the event a donor should be audited.").
22. That is, because there will be little revenue gained from revoking a
church's exemption, the IRS will gain little financial benefit. It will, however, bear
the financial costs of auditing and litigating against a disqualified church, as well
as the reputational harm of being painted as anti-church. See infra, notes 161-64
and accompanying text.
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THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF TAX-EXEMPT STATUS

Exemption from taxation under section 501(c)(3) provides
organizations with a number of benefits. These benefits range
from the public's perception of legitimacy to the reduced cost of
donations to donors to the fact that the organization keeps all
of the money it raises. 23
Most organizations that wish to become exempt under
section 501(c)(3) must file an application with the IRS. 24
Among other things, the application must include various
financial statements, a statement of proposed activities, and
organizational documents. 25 Churches, their integrated
auxiliaries, and associations of churches are exempt from the
application
requirement;
these church-related
entities
automatically qualify for exemption. 26
Section 501(c)(3) exempts two types of organizations from
taxation: public charities and private foundations. 27 These
public charities and private foundations receive two significant
tax benefits. First, they are generally exempt from federal
income taxation. 2 8 Second, donors to these exempt
organizations can deduct their donations as long as they
itemize their deductions. 29
23. Aloke Chakravarty, Feeding Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility of
Aid in a Comprehensive Antiterrorism Financing Strategy, 32 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 295, 323 (2010) ("[Section 501(c)(3)] status attracts donors because it affords
a double tax benefit; that is, the donors to the organization can deduct the amount
of their donation and the corporation need not pay taxes on any income. More
importantly, however, the § 501(c)(3) label is the closest thing to a barometer of
legitimacy that exists in the realm of charitable giving in the United States.").
24. I.R.C. § 508(a) (2012). To qualify as exempt under section 501(c)(3), an
entity must file IRS Form 1023. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(n)(7) (as amended in 2002).
25. § 601.201(n)(7)(i)(c)-(e).
26. I.R.C. § 508(c)(1). The Senate did not explain why it felt that churchrelated entities did not need to apply for exemption; it hinted, though, that
permitting churches to qualify without applying was consistent with the "efficient
administration" of the tax law. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 54 (1969).
27. Robert Paine, The Tax Treatment of International Philanthropy and
Public Policy, 19 AKRON TAx J. 1, 3 n. 10 (2004).
28. l.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (2012). Public charities do pay income taxes,
however, at their ordinary rates on their unrelated business taxable income.
§ 511(a) (2012). Unrelated business taxable income includes income from for-profit
business activities, § 512(a) (West Supp. 2015), and a portion of the income
derived from debt-financed property, § 514(a) (2012).
29. § 170(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 114-49). Charitable deductions are only
available to taxpayers who itemize, and taxpayers only itemize if the sum of
certain classes of deductions exceed the standard deduction. See Lilian V.
Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An Introduction to
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The tax exemption means, in essence, that public charities
and private foundations have more money with which to
pursue their mission. Currently, non-exempt corporations pay
federal income taxes at a top rate of 35%.30 Effectively, then, a
for-profit corporation can spend no more than $65 of every $100
of pre-tax income it earns. 3 1 A tax-exempt organization, by
contrast, can spend the full $100 that it receives.
Similarly, the deductibility of charitable donations
functions as a government subsidy to the charity. 32 A taxpayer
in the 39.6% tax bracket who itemizes can donate $100 to a
public charity, and then deduct that donation. Because
deductions reduce a taxpayer's tax bill by her marginal tax
rate, 33 the $100 donation only costs the donor $61.40 after
taxes. Yet the charity has $100 it can use. Where did the extra
$39.60 come from? Effectively, it came from the federal
government. Even though the federal government did not
transfer any money to the charity, it allowed its revenue to be
reduced by $39.60.
The charitable deduction therefore lowers the cost to
donors of donating. The conventional wisdom historically held
that charitable donations were price-elastic. 34 If charitable
giving were price-elastic, then the lower the cost, the more
donors would give. 35 As demonstrated above, the charitable
Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1321 (2012).
30. § 11(b)(1)(D) (2012).
31. The amount of after-tax income a corporation can spend ultimately
depends not only on its federal income tax rate, but also on state income taxes.
States differ radically in the rates at which they tax corporate income. In 2014,
the top marginal rates ranged from zero to 12 percent. See Tax Facts: State
Corporate Income Tax Rates 2002-2008, 2010-2014, TAX POL'Y CTR.,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=244 [http://perma.
cc/FG57-5MHC].
32. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The
Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 517 (2010) ("[T]he charitable
deduction .. . [is] justifiable as tax expenditures to subsidize charity generally.").
33. This is because the deduction reduces a taxpayer's taxable income. I.R.C.
§ 63(a) (2012) ("'[T]axable income' means gross income minus the deductions
allowed by this chapter. . . ."). If a taxpayer has $1,000 of taxable income and
pays taxes at a rate of 39.6%, she will owe $396 in taxes. If, however, she can
deduct $100, she will have a tax liability of $356.40. The deduction has reduced
her tax liability by $39.60, which is the amount of the deduction times her
marginal tax rate.
34. See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE
GIVING 41 (1985) ("In general, then, the deductibility of contributions has an
income effect and a substitution effect. If giving is a normal good, both effects will
tend to encourage contributions.").
35. Id.
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deduction reduces the after-tax cost to donors of making
charitable contributions, which, in turn, should cause donors to
give more than they otherwise would have given. 36
The bulk of economic evidence indicates that the
charitable deduction does increase the amount a donor will
donate to a charity. 37 Thus, the tax exemption and the
deductibility of donations provide public charities with a double
benefit.
But qualifying as a tax-exempt organization comes with
limitations on what the organization can do. Running afoul of
these limitations does not break the law, as it were, but it
subjects the organization to penalties, including the loss of its
tax exemption. 3 8 Broadly speaking, the exemption and ability
to receive deductible donations are limited to types of
organizations explicitly listed in the Code, including religious,
charitable, scientific, and educational institutions. 39 Although
the Code says that such organizations must be "organized and
operated exclusively for" their qualifying purposes, 4 0 the
Treasury regulations temper the exclusivity requirement. An
organization will qualify as being operated exclusively for its

36. More recent studies indicate, however, that charitable giving is less priceelastic than conventionally believed. See, e.g., William C. Randolph, Dynamic
Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J.
POL. ECON. 709, 735 (1995) ("[G]iving is substantially less price elastic and more
income elastic in terms of permanent changes in prices and income. Giving also
appears to be more price elastic and less income elastic than in past studies in
terms of transitory changes in prices and income."); Richard Steinberg, Taxes and
Giving: New Findings, 1 VOLUNTAS: INT'L J. OF VOLUNTARY AND NONPROFIT
ORGS. 61, 76 (1990) ("Early analyses from panels of tax data indicate that giving
is price inelastic, although further analysis is necessary to determine whether this
conclusion is robust to plausible variations in statistical technique."). Ultimately,
because of the lower price-elasticity of charitable contributions, providing
deductions to charitable donors may not be an efficient means of increasing
charitable donations. Kevin Stanton Barrett et al., Further Evidence on the
Dynamic Impact of Taxes on Charitable Giving, 50 NAT. TAX J. 321, 332 (1997)
("Our results challenge the view that tax deductions for charitable giving are
treasury efficient (e.g., that they stimulate an increase in donations that exceeds
foregone tax revenues) or that they are efficient in Roberts' (1987) sense (that
they accomplish a given expenditure level on some good at lowest social cost).").
37. See, e.g., John A. List, The Market for Charitable Giving, 25 J. ECON.
PERSP. 157, 170-72 (2011) (reviewing various economic and empirical studies to
conclude that "there is a fair amount of evidence, although not universal
agreement, that charitable giving is at least unitary price elastic if not price
elastic, especially amongst the high-income classes.").
38. Brunson, supra note 6, at 130.

39.

I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).

40.

Id. (emphasis added).
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charitable purpose if it "engages primarily in activities which
accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in
section 501(c)(3)." 4 1 In addition to being organized and operated
exclusively for a qualifying purpose, most organizations must
file an application with the IRS. 4 2

Once the IRS has granted an organization its exemption,
the organization must continue to engage primarily in
activities that will accomplish its exempt purpose. 43 Most
exempt organizations must also file an informational return
every year of their operation. 4 4 As with the application
requirement, churches are excluded from this filing
requirement. 45
As it operates, no part of the earnings of an exempt
organization can inure to the benefit of shareholders or other
individuals. 46 No substantial part of a public charity's or
private foundation's activities can include lobbying,4 7 and
public charities and private foundations are absolutely
forbidden from campaigning for or against any candidate for
office. 48
Violating any of these operating requirements can result in
a public charity facing penalties, including loss of its
exemption. The following Part will specifically discuss the
penalties prescribed for a public charity's violation of the
campaigning prohibition.
II. PENALTIES FOR VIOLATING THE CAMPAIGNING PROHIBITION
A public charity or a private foundation that violates the
campaigning prohibition is subject to two codified punitive
41.
42.
43.

Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2014).
I.R.C. § 508(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(a)(3) (as amended in 2014).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1).
Id. § 1.6033-2(a)(1) (as amended in 2015).
I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012). In 1969, Congress contemplated ending

44.
45.
churches' exemption from the filing requirement; that galvanized churches into
action, and they lobbied extensively to maintain their exemption. See Samuel D.
Brunson, The Present, Past, and Future of LDS Financial Transparency, 48
DIALOGUE 1, 5-7 (2015). Ultimately, while the House of Representatives passed a
bill that would have required churches to file an annual return, the churches
convinced the Senate to preserve their exemption. Id.
46. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
47. Though it is unclear how much lobbying constitutes a "substantial part" of
an organization's purposes, courts have put the percentage in the five- to twentypercent range. Brunson, supra note 6, at 144.
48. Id.
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measures as well as informal enforcement mechanisms that
the IRS has used on limited occasions. 4 9 The formal statutory
sanctions available to the IRS are the ability to impose an
excise tax on the organization and on its management 50 and
the ability to revoke a tax-exempt entity's exemption. 5 1
Informally, the IRS can use its investigative powers to convince
churches to agree to comply with the campaigning
prohibition. 52 This Part will first discuss the excise tax imposed
on tax-exempt entities and their officers where the entity
violates the campaigning prohibition. It will then discuss the
mandatory revocation of tax exemption that Congress
prescribed for tax-exempt public charities that violate the
campaigning prohibition. After discussing the IRS's statutory
enforcement regimes, it will end with informal sanctions that
the IRS may use to encourage compliance with the
campaigning prohibition.
A. Formal Sanctions
The excise tax aims to discourage both tax-exempt entities
and their managers from campaigning for or against
candidates for office.5 3 It does so by taxing both the entity and
any manager who knowingly agreed to the political
expenditure. 54 Initially, the entity must pay 10% of the amount
of the political expenditures and the managers 2.5%.5 If the
entity fails to correct the expenditure within the requisite
taxable period, the entity's excise tax jumps to 100% of the
political expenditure, while the managers' jumps to 50%.56 To
correct the expenditure, a tax-exempt entity must recover its
49. Supra note 8 and accompanying text.
50. I.R.C. § 4955(a) (2012).
51. Brunson, supra note 6, at 130 ("If a public charity ...
supports or opposes
a candidate for office, it no longer qualifies for a tax exemption, and its tax
exemption should thus be revoked.").
52. See infra Section II.C.
53. § 4955(a). Though the IRS does not generally publicize the imposition of
this excise tax, it has been imposed on occasion. See I.R.S., PROJECT 302:
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, FINAL REPORT 18 & n.6 (2006)
[hereinafter PACI REPORT], http://www.irs.gov/file source/pub/irs-tege/final-paci
report.pdf [http://perma.cc/C2N5-3BC6] (reporting the results of an IRS
investigation of public charities, including churches and non-church entities, that
allegedly violated the campaigning prohibition).
54. § 4955(a).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 4955(b).
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expenditure to the extent possible, as well as implement
safeguards to prevent such a political expenditure from
happening again. 57
While the excise tax may have real teeth under certain
circumstances, it does not always. A "political expenditure,"
which determines the amount of the excise tax, is the amount
paid by the public charity or private foundation as part of its
participation in the proscribed campaign. 58 If the public charity
paid, for example, to produce and run a national television
advertisement, the political expenditure (and, as a result, the
excise tax) could be substantial. If, on the other hand, the
pastor of a church endorsed a candidate for office in the middle
of a sermon, the political expenditure, if any, would be
inconsequential. 59 The risk of owing an excise tax of ten
percent, or even of 100 percent, of an inconsequential
expenditure would do nothing to discourage the church from
endorsing the candidate.
The excise tax, though, is not the only arrow the IRS has in
its enforcement quiver. "Any charitable organization. .. ceases
to qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3), or to
receive
tax-deductible
charitable
contributions,
if it
participates or intervenes in any political campaign for or
against a candidate for public office." 60 Accordingly, a taxexempt organization that ceases to qualify for tax-exempt
status must have its tax exemption revoked. 6 1
57.

Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(e) (1995).

58.

I.R.C. § 4955(d)(1).

59. Professor Benjamin Leff has proposed that the IRS not focus on the
marginal cost of violating the campaigning prohibition, but instead allocate a
portion of the organization's broader costs to the violation. Benjamin M. Leff, "Sit
Down and Count the Cost'` A Framework for Constitutionally Enforcing the
501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673, 716 (2009). For
example, if a pastor were to endorse a candidate for office in her sermon, rather
than looking at the costs associated with that sermon, the IRS could look at the
total number of hours associated with creating and delivering that sermon, and
compare that to the total number of hours the pastor worked, and add that
amount to any third-party costs incurred in the course of violating the
campaigning prohibition. Id. at 719. Such an allocative method would certainly
provide the excise tax with more teeth. At the same time, though, if the IRS were
to formally provide such guidance, its guidance would be in explicit contravention
of the statutory scheme enacted by Congress. See infra Section II.B.
60. H.R. REP. No. 100-495, at 1019 (1987) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1987-3

C.B. 193, 300.
61. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(a) (1995) ("The excise taxes imposed by
section 4955 do not affect the substantive standards for tax exemption under
section 501(c)(3), under which an organization is described in section 501(c)(3)
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As a formal matter, the IRS revokes a tax-exempt
organization's exemption by issuing it a private letter ruling. 62
In the private letter ruling, the IRS explains why the
organization's exemption is being revoked and explains that, if
the organization disagrees with the IRS's conclusions, it can
file an appeal. 63 The IRS also informs the organization that
donors can no longer deduct their contributions and that the
organization will need to file a tax return (rather than the
informational return required from non-church tax-exempt
organizations). 64 The consequences to an organization of losing
its tax exemption are not limited to the federal government
either. When a tax-exempt organization loses its exemption,
the IRS must notify appropriate state officials of the loss of
exemption. 65 The loss of a federal tax exemption may also
trigger the loss of an organization's state exemption, which
could subject the organization to, among other things, state
property, sales, and income taxes. 6 6
Ultimately, the excise tax and the loss of exemption
function differently to achieve the same ends. The excise tax
imposes a sliding burden on a tax-exempt organization for
violating the campaigning prohibition, but bolsters the
effectiveness of that burden by also imposing an excise tax on
the organization's managers. 67 As a result, the managers risk
personal liability if they allow the exempt organization to
endorse or oppose a candidate for office. 68
In spite of the potential personal expense, the excise tax is
easy to avoid. Because it is calculated as a percentage of the
tax-exempt organization's expenditure in endorsing a
only if it does not participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf of
any candidate for public office.").

62.

See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-24-033 (Jun. 15, 2007).

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. I.R.C. § 6104(c)(1)(A) (2012).
66. For example, a tax-exempt corporation in Texas loses its franchise tax
exemption if it loses its federal exemption. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.063(g)
(West 2015). In Connecticut, exemption from both the sales and use tax and the
corporation business tax depend on a corporation's maintaining its federal
exemption. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-412(8), 12-214(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 2015). A taxexempt entity in Georgia that loses its federal exemption also loses its state
exemption. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-25(b)(2)(A)(i) (2013). And Massachusetts bases
its corporate tax exemption on an entity's having a federal exemption. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 63, § 38Y(b) (2015).
67. I.R.C. § 4955(a) (2012).
68. Id. § 4955(a)(2).
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candidate, to the extent that the tax-exempt organization
endorses a candidate without spending a substantive amount
of money, the excise tax has little sting. On the other hand,
although the loss of exemption does not impact individual
managers personally, it potentially has a devastating effect on
the organization. Without a tax exemption, the organization's
federal and state tax bills will increase, as all of its income
suddenly becomes subject to taxation. Moreover, the cost of
donating to the organization-at least for taxpayers who
itemize-will increase, as the government no longer bears any
of the cost of the donation. 6 9
B. The Excise Tax Does Not Substitute for Revocation
Though the excise tax and revocation use different routes
to accomplish the same result, the excise tax does not
substitute for revocation. 70 Instead, Congress intended to
impose the excise tax in addition to a tax-exempt organization's
loss of its exemption. 7 1
In 1987, Congress was concerned that some tax-exempt
organizations would view loss of exemption as insufficiently
deterrent to prevent them from endorsing a candidate for
office. 7 2 A tax-exempt organization that merely wanted to
funnel deductible contributions to candidates for office could
immediately cease operations after distributing the money and
before being audited, thus avoiding the bite of revocation. 73
To combat this potential abuse, Congress decided, "the
sanction of revocation of tax-exempt status should be
supplemented by an excise tax."74 In explaining the change,
Congress explicitly says that the excise tax applies to
organizations that have "ceased to qualify as tax-exempt" and
to certain managers of organizations "whose exempt status has

69.
70.
71.

See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(a) (1995).
H.R. REP. No. 100-495, at 1020 (1987) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1987-3

C.B. 193, 300. ("The adoption of the excise tax sanction does not modify the
present-law rule that an organization is not tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3), or

eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, if the organization
engages in any political campaign activities.").
72. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 2, at 1631 (1987), as reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1211 to -1212.
73. Id.

74.

Id.
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been revoked." 75 In spite of the clear intent of Congress and the
clear statutory scheme, the IRS, on at least a handful of
occasions, imposed the excise tax without revoking an
organization's exemption. 76 The IRS's decision to impose the
excise tax as a standalone penalty is unsupported by either
Congress's intent or the language of the Code.
The IRS's substitution of the excise tax for revocation
stands in stark contrast to another excise tax faced by taxexempt organizations that violate requirements for their tax
exemption. The Code imposes a different excise tax on the
managers of a tax-exempt organization that engages in an
excess-benefit transaction. 7 7 In an excess-benefit transaction, a
tax-exempt organization pays more to certain insiders than the
services or goods they provide to the tax-exempt organization
are worth. 7 8
An excess-benefit transaction violates section 501(c)(3)'s
prohibition on private inurement, and, as a result, a taxexempt entity that engages in such a transaction no longer
qualifies as tax-exempt. 79 Like the excise tax on campaigning,
the excise tax on excess-benefit transactions appears additive
to, not substitutive for, revocation.8 0 Unlike the excise tax for
campaigning, the Treasury regulations governing the excise
tax on excess benefit transactions allow the IRS to impose the
excise tax without revoking the entity's exemption. Under
regulations, the determination of whether to impose the excise
tax in place of, rather than in addition to, revocation depends
on a facts-and-circumstances test. 8 1
The regulations provide no similar test for the
campaigning excise tax. The Treasury is clearly capable of
writing regulations that soften the mandatory revocation of a
tax-exempt entity's exemption, yet it has not done so with
respect to the campaigning prohibition. 82 This fact, in concert
with Congress's clear statement that the excise tax was to be
75.
76.

Id. at 1632.
See, e.g., PACI REPORT, supra note 53, at 18 n.6.

77.

I.R.C. § 4958(a) (2012).

78. Id. § 4958(c)(1).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2014) ("An organization is
not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure
in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.").
80. I.R.C. § 4958(a) (imposing excise tax without mentioning revocation of tax
exemption).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(f)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2014).
82. See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1 (2014).
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imposed in addition to, not in place of, revocation,
demonstrates that the existence of the excise tax does nothing
to eliminate revocation as a mandatory penalty for violating
the campaigning prohibition. 83 In fact, together they give added
weight to the assertion that, under current law, a tax-exempt
organization that violates the campaigning prohibition must
lose its tax exemption.
C. Informal Sanctions
Not only has the IRS misapplied the clear penalty scheme
laid out by the Code, but when it took initiative to try to
enforce the campaigning prohibition, it ended up using extrastatutory means to do so. In 2004, for the first time, the IRS's
Exempt Organizations Division initiated its Political Activity
Compliance Initiative (PACI), which was the IRS's first
attempt to expeditiously investigate alleged violations of the
campaigning prohibition. 84 The PACI started with 132 cases,
but the IRS closed twenty-two of those after it determined that
those cases did not merit further investigation. 85 Of the 110
tax-exempt entities that the IRS did investigate, forty-seven
were churches and the remaining sixty-three were non-church
exempt entities. 86 By 2006, the IRS had closed forty of the
cases dealing with churches. 8 7 Of those, the IRS issued nochange written advisories to thirty-four.8 8
For purposes of the PACI, "no-change written advisories"
were issued where the church had, in fact, violated the
campaigning prohibition, but the violation was anomalous (or
the church relied on the opinion of counsel), it corrected its
violation to the extent possible, and it took steps to prevent
future violations. 89 Though the IRS developed this informal
policing strategy with no statutory or regulatory basis, it
demonstrates that, in 2004, the IRS gave serious thought to
investigating violations of the campaigning prohibition by
churches. Subsequent to the 2004 PACI, though, the IRS
appears to have effectively dropped even this limited approach
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
PAC REPORT, supra note 53, at 2.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 18.
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to enforcement, leaving churches free to flout the campaigning
prohibition with impunity. 90
III. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND (NOT) ENFORCING THE
CAMPAIGNING PROHIBITION
Although the Code clearly states that a church does not
qualify as tax exempt if it campaigns on behalf of or against a
candidate for office, 9 1 the campaigning prohibition is not selfenforcing. Rather, to enforce the campaigning prohibition, the
IRS must take active steps to revoke the church's tax
exemption. 9 2 This Part will discuss the reasons that enforcing
the prohibition requires IRS initiative, first by explaining why
taxpayers and watchdog groups do not have standing to
challenge the IRS's nonenforcement. Next, it will discuss the
special Establishment Clause standing rules, and why those
rules are unavailing. Finally, it will discuss the judicially
created doctrine of administrative discretion.
The revocation of a church's tax exemption is solely within
the purviewof the IRS. 9 3 Even if another taxpayer witnesses
the church violate the campaigning prohibition, the only thing
a third-party taxpayer can do is bring the violation of the
campaigning prohibition to the IRS's attention. 94 Even if the
IRS refuses to act, the taxpayer has no judicial recourse. 9 5 An
individual can only access the federal judiciary if she has
standing to do so. 96

Standing generally requires that a litigant have suffered
an "injury in fact" that can be traced to the defendant's actions
and that can be redressed by the courts. 9 7 Taxpayers generally
have no standing to challenge the IRS's decision not to enforce
the tax law against another person where, as here, the IRS's
actions have not directly harmed them. 98 In other words,
90.

See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. Koskinen, 298 F.R.D. 385, 386

(W.D. Wis. 2014) (finding that the IRS has a policy of non-enforcement of the
campaigning prohibition against churches).
91. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
92. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(n)(6)(i) (as amended in 2002).
93. Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the Watchers: Preventing LR.S. Abuse of
the Tax System, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 223, 235 (2013).
94. Id.
95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (standing requires a case or controversy).

96.
97.
98.

Id.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Id.
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taxpayers have no standing to sue the IRS for failure to revoke
the church's tax exemption. 99
Congress has, on occasion, provided for less stringent
standing requirements. In 1934, in response to the risk of
Congress passed the
unknowing patent infringement,
weakened the standing
Act
Act.
The
Judgments
Declaratory
requirement slightly by allowing "potential infringers to 'clear
the air' by seeking declaratory relief in federal court instead of
waiting for the patent owner to file an infringement suit."1 00
The Declaratory Judgments Act allows courts, in some
circumstances, to "declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration."1 0 1
The Act does not apply, however, to federal taxes. 10 2 The
Declaratory Judgments Act is mirrored by the Anti-Injunction
Act, which prevents taxpayers from filing suits "for the purpose
of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax."1 0 3

Together, the Declaratory Judgments Act and the AntiInjunction Act effectively prevent courts from engaging in any
"pre-enforcement review of tax cases." 104 Thus, a church cannot
challenge the campaigning prohibition until the IRS enforces
the prohibition against it.
The Supreme Court has, however, carved out an exception
to the general rule of individualized injury-in-fact. In Flast v.
Cohen, it held that an individual sometimes has standing to
challenge legislation solely as a result of her status as a
taxpayer. 0 5 This type of standing-without-individualized-harm
occurs when a taxpayer can (a) establish a link between her
status as a taxpayer and the challenged legislation and (b)
demonstrate a "nexus between that status and the precise

99. Cf. Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 36 (1976)
(holding the indigent taxpayers lacked standing to challenge the IRS's grant of
exemption to hospitals that did not provide free care).
100. Amelia Smith Rinehart, Patent Cases and Public Controversies, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 361, 367 (2013).

101.

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).

102. Id. (stating that courts can generally provide declaratory relief to litigants
"except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section
7428 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986").
103. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2012).
104. Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury's
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking
Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1167 (2008).

105.

392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
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nature of the constitutional infringement alleged."l 06 This type
of standing eventually came to be known as "Establishment
Clause standing," and allowed taxpayers standing to "challenge
government support of religion as a violation of the
Establishment Clause, even where they suffered no unique
personal injury."l07
Establishment Clause standing is not a solution, however,
for taxpayers who wish to challenge the IRS's nonenforcement
of the campaigning prohibition. Though the Supreme Court has
not overturned Flast, it has subjected Flast to a "highly literal
interpretation" that significantly limits its applicability. 0 8
Under the Court's highly literal interpretation, an individual
can only demonstrate Establishment Clause standing where
"moneys have been extracted from a citizen and handed to a
religious institution in violation of the citizen's conscience." 09
That is, to invoke Establishment Clause standing, a potential
litigant who has not suffered individualized harm must show
both taxing and spending.I10 The IRS's neglect in enforcing the
campaigning prohibition does not implicate both, and therefore,
taxpayers would need to show individualized injury. Because
they have no individualized injury, they cannot access the
judiciary through the alternative Establishment Clause
standing route, either. I"
Moreover, even if a taxpayer had standing to sue, she could
not force the IRS to enforce the campaigning prohibition. In
1985, the Supreme Court held, in Heckler v. Chaney, that
administrative agencies
have
a type of prosecutorial
discretion.1 12 This administrative discretion generally gives
106. Id.
107. Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has
Reduced Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L.
REv. 777, 798 (2013).
108. Id. at 800.
109. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448 (2011).
110. See Sugin, supra note 107, at 800.
111. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (stating that a
government's decision to decline imposing a tax renders any injury speculative,
and thus cannot provide proper standing).
112. 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) ("The FDA's decision not to take the
enforcement actions requested by respondents is therefore not subject to judicial
review under the APA."). But see Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Shulman,

961 F. Supp. 2d 947, 954 (W.D. Wis. 2013) ("The IRS's second and third
arguments fail because they depend on the false premise that the Foundation is
challenging the IRS's policy pursuant to the APA. In fact, the Foundation is
challenging that policy pursuant to the Fifth Amendment's equal-protection
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agencies leeway to decline to enforce statutes and shields their
inaction from judicial review. 113
The Supreme Court grounded the right of the Executive
Branch to refuse to enforce laws in three main considerations.
First, the decision not to enforce requires agencies to balance a
number of factors, including whether a violation has occurred
and whether the agency's resources are best spent addressing
the violation in question. 114 The agency has better access to the
various priorities that need ordering than does the court.1 15
Second, the Supreme Court noted that, in refusing to act,
agencies do not exercise coercive power over liberty or
property.116 Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that an
agency's refusal to act was similar to the decision not to
"indict-a decision which has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch."11 7
Though agencies, including the IRS, enjoy a large amount
of discretion with respect to inaction, they do not enjoy
unfettered discretion. With the right facts, litigants can
overcome the presumption of immunity from judicial review
that agency inaction carries. 1 18 The responsibility for making
agency inaction reviewable by the courts lies first with
Congress.1 1 9 Congress can explicitly require an agency to
enforce the law. 120
Heckler also leaves open the possibility that an agency's
inaction may be subject to judicial review if it has adopted a
policy of nonenforcement so extreme that the policy amounts
"to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities."l21 The

component and the Establishment Clause.").
113. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 653 (1985).
114. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831; see also Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary
Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1553, 1564 (2014) (stating that administrative discretion is grounded in the
fact that "execution of the law requires applying the law to facts, making policy
judgments about enforcement, and even at times determining the facts relevant
for enforcement").
115. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32.
116. Id. at 832. In the tax context, this assertion may not be entirely true; to
the extent the IRS refuses to collect taxes that would otherwise be due, other
taxpayers must make up the lost revenue.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 832-33.
119. Id. at 833.
120. Id. at 834-35.
121. Id. at 833 n.4.
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opinion does not ultimately address the contours of agency
abdication, however. The Supreme Court has not yet revisited
the question of agency abdication. 122
Although litigants periodically raise abdication questions,
courts have not had the opportunity to explore the specifics of
agency abdication. Rather, they find that, even if abdication of
agency responsibilities permits judicial review, litigants have
failed to demonstrate agency abdication. 123 Ultimately, though,
potential litigants should not take comfort in the existence of
this abdication exception to administrative discretion. It is
"admittedly vague and not easily subject to judicial
administration," and, as a result, "will usually amount to a
judicially underenforced constraint."1 2 4 Instead, judges will
principally use it as a backstop available "in extreme cases."l 2 5
The IRS's failure to revoke the tax exemptions of churches
that violate the campaigning prohibition appears to fall
squarely within the protected area of Heckler v. Chaney. The
Code states that an exempt church is one "which does not
participate in, or intervene in . .
any political campaign on
behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office." 1 2 6
The Code expressly anticipates that tax exempt organizations
will lose their exemption as a result of campaigning. 12 7 It does
not, however, explicitly require the IRS to enforce the
campaigning prohibition, nor does it contain any other
language indicating "an intent to circumscribe [IRS]
enforcement discretion."1 28 Even though the Code makes clear

122. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The Court
had no occasion in deciding Chaney, however, nor has it had occasion since, to
apply this hypothetical 'abdication' principle to the presumption of nonreviewability.").
123. See, e.g., id. at 170-71; Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 252 F.3d 456,
461 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Similarly, we cannot say that settlement is an 'extreme'
policy that amounts to 'an abdication of [FERC's] statutory responsibilities."');
N.Y. State Dep't of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Texas v.
United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997) ("We reject out-of-hand the
State's contention that the federal defendants' alleged systemic failure to control
immigration is so extreme as to constitute a reviewable abdication of duty.").
124. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of "Not Now": When
Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 162 (2014).
125. Id.
126. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
127. § 504(a) (2012) (stating that an organization that loses its exemption
under section 501(c)(3) for violating the campaigning prohibition cannot become
exempt under section 501(c)(4)).
128. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834 (1985).
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that if a church campaigns for or against a candidate for office,
it no longer qualifies as tax-exempt, Congress has not expressly
required the IRS to revoke the exemption of an organization
that violates the rule. 129 As such, under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of agency discretion, the courts have no
jurisdiction to require the IRS to enforce the campaigning
prohibition by revoking churches' tax exemptions. 130
The only explicit mention of the IRS revoking a public
charity's (including a church's) exemption comes in the
Treasury regulations.131 Congress delegated the authority to
write regulations to the Treasury,1 3 2 meaning that regulatory
mandates are insufficient to overcome the presumption of
agency discretion. Even if Congress were to adopt the language
of the regulation into the Code, the IRS would maintain its
discretion not to revoke a church's tax exemption. 13 3 The
regulation lays out the process by which the IRS revokes an
entity's tax exemption, but does not require the IRS to do so. 134
Even if an agency's abdication of its responsibility is
sufficient to grant judicial oversight to agency inaction, it is
unlikely that the IRS's failure to revoke offending churches'
exemptions would qualify as an abdication. The IRS's general
failure to enforce the campaigning prohibition does not derive
from any policy, formal or informal, that "expressly abdicat[es]
any relevant statutory responsibility." 35 Nor could a court
infer that the IRS has an implicit policy abdicating its
responsibility for enforcing the campaigning prohibition.1 36 In
fact, the IRS has, at times, investigated allegations of churches
campaigning. 13 7 Even though the IRS ultimately decided not to
129. See § 501(c)(3) (lacking language explicitly directing IRS to enforce
campaigning prohibition).
130. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834.
131. See Treas. Reg. § 601.201(n)(6)(i) (as amended in 2002) ("An exemption
ruling or determination letter may be revoked or modified by a ruling or
determination letter. . . .").
132. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012) ([T]he Secretary [of the Treasury Department]
shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this
title .... ).
133. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 834.
134. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(n)(6)(a) (as amended in 2002) (providing that
exemption may be revoked "by a ruling or determination letter addressed to the
organization, or by a revenue ruling or other statement published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin").
135. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 166 (2d. Cir. 2004).
136. See, e.g., id. at 167.
137. See Brunson, supra note 6, at 151 (discussing the IRS's 2004 PACI).
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revoke the tax exemption of any churches,' 3 8 it is hard to
convincingly argue that it has entirely abdicated its statutory
responsibility. Taxpayers are left with no way to challenge the
IRS's nonenforcement of the campaigning prohibition in court.
As a result, the IRS acts as the sole gatekeeper to judicial
review of the campaigning prohibition, a topic discussed in
greater detail below.
IV. THE IRS IS THE GATEKEEPER TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

In theory, the IRS should have little difficulty enforcing
the campaigning prohibition against churches. When it comes
to the IRS's attention that a church has endorsed or opposed a
candidate for office,1 39 the IRS can simply draft a private letter
ruling that revokes the church's tax exemption. 140
In spite of the technical ease with which the IRS could
revoke the tax exemptions of churches that violate the
campaigning prohibition, there exist a number of impediments,
both legal and practical, to the IRS's doing so. The principal
legal impediment is the process the IRS must follow in
attempting to revoke a church's tax exemption. In general, the
IRS faces little difficulty in initiating and pursuing audits of
taxpayers.1 4 1 It has statutory authority to audit any

138. Id.
139. I mean "comes to the I.R.S.'s attention" quite literally. Certainly the IRS
can search out churches that endorse candidates, but, in many cases, such IRS
effort proves unnecessary. Watchdog groups can and do report church political
endorsements to the IRS. See, e.g., FFRF Sues IRS to Enforce Church
Electioneering Ban, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND. (Nov. 14, 2012),
http://ffrf.org/news/news-releases/item/ 16091-ffrf-sues-irs-to-enforce-churchelectioneering-ban [http://perma.cc/8HVS-ECWZ] ("FFRF has sent letters of
complaint to the IRS involving 27 other [church electioneering] violations so far
this year."); Stephanie Strom, Watchdog Group Accuses Churches of Political
Action,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
26,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
10/26/washington/26church.html [http://perma.cc/2SAE-2EYF] (explaining that
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington filed complaint asking the
IRS to investigate role of two churches in Kansas election).
140. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-24-033 (June 15, 2007) (revoking
exempt organization's tax exemption for, inter alia, buying full-page newspaper
advertisement opposing candidate, sending 8,000 mailings opposing candidate,
and sending emails opposing candidate); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001 (Sep.
5, 1990) (revoking tax-exempt organization's exemption because its voter
education activities in fact supported particular candidates for office).
141. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) ("[T]he Commissioner need
not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of his
summons. . . .").
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taxpayer,1 42 as well as the authority to summon people and
records-and take their testimony under oath-in the course of
its examination. 14 3 The IRS does not have carte blanche in its
audits, of course: it cannot make unnecessary or overly
frequent examinations 1 44 and cannot infringe a taxpayer's
constitutional rights.1 45 But as long as the IRS stays within
these boundaries, it can audit taxpayers because it is
suspicious that they have violated the tax law, or even just for
assurance that they have not. 146

A. Church Audits
The IRS faces additional impediments in revoking a
church's exemption, though.1 4 7 In enacting the special
procedures governing the IRS's audit of churches, Congress
was "motivated by two competing considerations."1 4 8 First, it
was concerned that IRS church audits implicated the
separation of church and state and, moreover, the churches
lacked experience in interacting with the IRS.1 4 9 At the same
time, Congress did not want to entirely prevent the IRS from
auditing churches because taxpayers had increasingly been
using the church form to evade taxes.15 0
To ensure that the IRS did not speciously intrude on
churches' constitutionally mandated autonomy, Congress
enacted specific and burdensome procedures governing all
aspects of church audits. For the IRS to open a church tax
inquiry, it must first have an "appropriate high-level Treasury
official"
sign off on the
inquiry. 15 1 Only
Regional
Commissioners and higher Treasury officials qualify as
sufficiently high-level to initiate a church tax inquiry. 152 The
IRS must then send a very specific notice to the church,
142.

I.R.C. § 7601(a) (2012).

143.

Id. § 7602(a) (2012).

144. Id. § 7605(b) (2012).
145. Raheja v. Comm'r, 725 F.2d 64, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1984).
146. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57.
147. § 7611(a) (2012).
148. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
1984 at 1139 (Comm. Print 1984).
149. Id. at 1139-40.
150. Id. at 1140.
151. § 7611(a)(2).
152. Treas. Reg. § 301.7611-1, Q&A 1 (as amended in 2002).
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explaining its concerns, the administrative and constitutional
provisions applicable to the inquiry, and the provisions of the
Code that authorize the inquiry. 153
Even after the IRS has met these predicate requirements,
it faces burdensome restrictions on the actual examination of
the church. For example, it can only examine church records to
the extent necessary to determine the liability for and amount
of taxes a church may owe and to determine whether the
church is, in fact, a church.1 54 The IRS must provide a church
with notice of an examination and a list of records it intends to
examine at least fifteen days in advance of the examination. 155
And once it has begun an inquiry or examination, the IRS must
complete it within two years. 15 6
Even if the IRS gets permission to audit a church, and
determines over the course of the audit that the church had
engaged in prohibited campaigning, it cannot revoke the
church's tax exemption the same way it would revoke a nonchurch public charity's exemption. 157 Instead, the appropriate
IRS regional counsel must determine, in writing, that the IRS
complied with the church inquiry procedures and approve, in
writing, the revocation. 158 And if the IRS undertakes an
inquiry that does not end in revocation or significant changes
in the church's operational practices, it cannot open a new
inquiry during the next five years unless the appropriate
Assistant Commissioner approves the new inquiry. 15 9
Still, this arduous procedure alone cannot fully explain the
notable absence of church exemptions that have been revoked
as a result of proscribed campaigning. In 2014 alone, more than
1,600 churches participated in the ADF's Pulpit Freedom
Sunday, explicitly endorsing or opposing a candidate for office
in their sermons. 160 But in the more than sixty-year existence
of the campaigning prohibition, the IRS has virtually never
revoked a church's exemption. 16 1
153.

I.R.C. § 7611(a)(3)(B).

154. Id. § 7611(b)(1).
155. Id. § 7611(b)(2)-(3).
156. Id. § 7611(c)(1).
157. See id. § 7611(d)(1).
158. Id.
159. Treas. Reg. § 301.7611-1, Q&A 16 (as amended in 2002).
160. Bade, supra note 11.
161. Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal
Boundariesof Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145,
159 (2006) ("In the fifty-four years following the passage of the prohibition, only
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The IRS has not explained why it has declined, on such a
consistent basis, to enforce the campaigning prohibition. In an
earlier article, I proposed that its failure to revoke churches'
tax exemptions results from a combination of a number of
factors, including the extreme nature of the penalty, with
potentially catastrophic consequences to a church. 16 2 Moreover,
this extreme, catastrophic penalty would likely raise very little
additional revenue for the government.1 63 At the same time,
the IRS could expect significant public displeasure, as the
public has blamed the IRS for acting in an unreasonable,
draconian manner, 164 even though it was following the law as
enacted by Congress. And, it is not just the public. Even
members of Congress-despite having passed every provision
of the Code-have attempted to shift the blame for unpopular
tax provisions to the IRS. For example, "[mjembers of Congress
often disingenuously refer to the 'IRS Code,' instead of the
Internal Revenue Code, implying that the IRS is the originator
of the Code."1 65
Looking at the question of enforcing the campaigning
prohibition from this perspective, the IRS's drastic
underenforcement makes logical sense. If it enforced the
campaigning prohibition, the IRS would risk widespread and
severe blowback with little tangible benefit to show for it.166 As
such, the IRS has every incentive to exercise its administrative
discretion and not address church political campaigning. 167

two churches have ever lost their tax-exempt status and only two others have
been required to pay excise taxes.").
162. Brunson, supra note 6, at 152 ("[Tjhe penalty for campaigning is
draconian, even where the infraction is minor or unintentional.").
163. Id. at 153.

164.

Id.

165. Robert J. Peroni, Tax Reform Interrupted: The Chaotic State of Tax Policy
in 2003, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 277, 315 (2004).
166. Brunson, supra note 6, at 153-54.
167. Put another way, at some point in enforcing the campaigning prohibition,
the utility to the IRS begins to decrease, in part because it "has considerations
other than just maximizing revenue, including political and media pressure and
proportionality." Andrew Blair-Stanek, Tax in the Cathedral: Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Tax, 99 VA. L. REV. 1169, 1210 (2013).
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B. The Impact of Churches on American Politics
The United States political system appears to have
survived the last sixty yearsl 6 8 relatively unscathed, in spite of
the lack of definitive judicial review of the constitutionality of
the campaigning prohibition. It is fair to ask whether there is
any justification for the IRS to begin enforcing the campaigning
prohibition if the political system can absorb church
campaigning without ill effects. The answer is clearly yes. In
the first instance, the question assumes, problematically, that
the political system has absorbed church campaigning
unscathed.
Even if the political system has remained unaffected by
church participation in politics, moreover, I argue that there
are at least three compelling reasons for the enforcement of the
campaigning prohibition against churches. First, the IRS
should enforce the law as written. Second, Congress should be
required to stand behind the law it has written. Third,
enforcement
would
allow
churches
to
place
the
constitutionality of the prohibition in front of the courts.

169

We cannot know, of course, what the political system
would look like if the IRS had enforced the campaigning
prohibition against churches over the last six decades.
Presumably, though, it would be different from what we
experience today.1 70 Clergy have the resources and opportunity
to influence parishioners.171 Parishioners, at the same time,
tend to be "receptive to the political cues [clergy] transmit." 72
In fact, clergy and churches have played "integral roles in
168. Congress added the campaigning prohibition to the Internal Revenue
Code in 1954. Brunson, supra note 6, at 135.
169. These three reasons apply irrespective of whether there have been any
substantive changes in the legal or social landscape surrounding the prohibition.
There have, however, been significant changes in both--changes that provide an
additional compelling reason for the IRS not only to begin enforcing the
campaigning prohibition, but to begin enforcing it immediately. See infra Section

IV.C.
170. Even if the campaigning prohibition was largely effective, albeit
unenforced, and the vast majority of churches did not endorse or oppose
candidates for office, at the very least, church endorsements would have had a
marginal effect on the political system.
171. Corwin E. Smidt, Theological and Political Orientation of Clergy Within
American Politics: An Analytical and Historical Overview, in PULPIT AND
POLITICS: CLERGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS AT THE ADVENT OF THE MILLENNIUM 3,

6 (Corwin E. Smidt ed., 2004).
172.

Id. at 7.
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American politics since the colonial period."l 73 If churches have
played such an important role in American politics over such a
long period, there is no reason to believe that their influence
has substantively diminished in the last sixty years.1 74
At the same time, though, Congress decided in 1954 to
limit churches' (and other public charities') ability to influence
partisan elections by banning them from campaigning. 175 Had
the IRS consistently enforced the campaigning prohibition,
churches would have engaged in less campaigning. 17 6 It is
precisely this type of influence that the campaigning
prohibition was intended to prevent.1 7 7 Though we cannot see
the world we would have had if churches refrained from
endorsing candidates, we know that it would be different than
the world that Congress envisioned when it enacted the
campaigning prohibition. As a result, the IRS's lack of
enforcement has had a real-world effect on our current political
system, one contrary to the vision of the law as enacted.

173. Laura R. Olson & Sue E. S. Crawford, Clergy in Politics: Political Choices
and Consequences, in CHRISTIAN CLERGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3, 3 (Sue E. S.
Crawford & Laura R. Olson eds., 2001).
174. Churches may have seen some diminution in influence over recent years;
between 2007 and 2014, the number of adults in the United States who do not
affiliate with a particular religion has increased from 16.1 percent to 22.8 percent.
PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA'S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 3 (2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/05/RLS-05-08-full-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
NXV5-DA28]. But even with the drastic increase in religiously-unaffiliated
Americans, more than 76 percent of Americans claim a religious affiliation. Id. at
4. While churches' influence may have declined, then, they still reach the vast
majority of Americans.
175. See Brunson, supra note 6, at 135.
176. One purpose behind revoking a public charity's tax-exempt status if it
violates the campaigning prohibition is that such a draconian penalty will deter
charities from campaigning. Blair-Stanek, supra note 167, at 1200. Though
Professor Blair-Stanek argues that status loss is a less effective form of
deterrence, its ineffectiveness derives from the IRS's hesitance to impose the
status loss. Id. If the IRS had consistently enforced it, notwithstanding its
draconian nature, fewer churches would have endorsed or opposed candidates,
thus risking the loss of their exemption, over the last sixty years.
177. The actual legislative intent behind the campaigning prohibition is
inscrutable. The prohibition was introduced by Senator Lyndon Johnson on the
floor of the Senate, and was enacted without any hearings or debate. Allan J.
Samansky, Tax Consequences when Churches Participatein Political Campaigns,
5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 145, 156-57 (2007).
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C. A Normative Case for Revoking Church Exemptions
Even if the IRS's nonenforcement has not affected the
course of the U.S. political system, there are at least three
reasons that the IRS should begin enforcing the prohibition
and should begin its enforcement as soon as practicable. First,
the IRS is charged with enforcing the tax law as written. 178
Though the IRS has administrative discretion, 179 such
discretion is neither legally nor pragmatically boundless.
Although the IRS has broad administrative discretion, it
cannot have a policy of abdicating its statutory obligation. 8 0
178. See Archie, Parnell, CongressionalInterference in Agency Enforcement: The
IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J. 1360, 1362 (1980) ("It is thus ... the duty of the IRS
as part of the executive branch to ensure that those laws are 'faithfully
executed."').
179. See supra notes 112-144 and accompanying text.
180. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985). It is worth noting that
one district court has challenged the idea that the IRS has administrative
discretion in this regard. That court held that the administrative discretion
granted to the IRS is limited to claims brought pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Shulman, 961 F. Supp. 2d
947, 954 (W.D. Wis. 2013). If that court's understanding of the scope of
administrative discretion is correct, it is possible that courts could review the
IRS's decision not to enforce the campaigning prohibition against churches. Id. It
is not clear, however, that the court was correct in its understanding of the source
and scope of administrative discretion. The court assumes that administrative
discretion derives solely from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but does
not cite to any precedent or otherwise justify that assumption. In fact, its full
analysis takes three sentences:
The IRS's second and third arguments [regarding sovereign immunity
and administrative discretion] fail because they depend on the false
premise that the Foundation is challenging the IRS's policy pursuant to
the APA. In fact, the Foundation is challenging that policy pursuant to
component and the
equal-protection
the
Fifth Amendment's
Establishment Clause. Thus, the limitations on claims brought pursuant
to the APA-including the requirement that the claim involve a final
agency action, see 5 U.S.C. § 704, and the requirement that the claim not
involve a matter committed to agency discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. §
701(a)(2)-do not apply.
Id. Although the court does not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that
administrative discretion is based solely on the APA, the nonenforcement that
gave rise to the Supreme Court's recognition of administrative discretion was
brought pursuant to the APA. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 823. The Supreme Court found
that the APA did provide a narrow bar to the judicial review of agency inaction.
Id. at 837. It also said that the respondents did not raise a colorable constitutional
claim, so "we do not address the issue that would be raised in such a case." Id. No
subsequent decisions have addressed the question of whether administrative
discretion exists when claims of nonenforcement arise pursuant to the
Constitution. As a result, while the IRS's general failure to enforce the
campaigning prohibition against churches may be judicially reviewable, such a
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Even if the IRS's decision not to enforce the campaigning
prohibition against churches does not represent an abdication
it judicially
making
responsibilities-thereby
of its
unreviewable-for pragmatic and policy purposes the IRS
should enforce it. As a normative matter, without some
countervailing consideration such as resource allocation or
ambiguity in the law, the law should be enforced. And here, the
law is clear: churches cannot campaign for or against
candidates for office and be exempt from taxation. 18 1 Moreover,
the campaigning prohibition is not an obscure part of the tax
law-national media report on the prohibition on a relatively
regular basis. 182 As a result, when taxpayers hear or read
about a church's endorsement of a candidate, and then see the
church face no repercussions for its violation of the tax law, the
news solidifies the public's perception that the IRS selectively
enforces the tax law. 183 Such selective enforcement provides at
best the image of an IRS willing to show favoritism, rather
than enforce the tax law objectively.
In addition to the pragmatic desire that taxpayers see the
tax law being enforced, the invocation of administrative
discretion stands in dissonance with the rule of law. Allowing
an agency the discretion to allocate its scarce enforcement
resources risks transforming agency knowledge into a vehicle
for biased administration of the tax law. 184 Professor Lawrence
Zelenak notes that for those who "take[] the rule of law
seriously, it is troubling to contemplate that the Treasury and
the IRS are almost unconstrained in their ability to make de
facto revisions to the Internal Revenue Code enacted by
Congress, as long as those revisions are in a taxpayer-favorable
direction." 18 5

conclusion is far from certain.
181. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (mandating that entities exempt under section
501(c)(3) cannot "participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office").
182. See supra note 12.
183. See, e.g., NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND
THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS 140 (2011)
("Commentators repeatedly have expressed worries that the IRS engages in
selective and abusive enforcement of the gag rule.").
184. Richard A. Epstein, The Perilous Position of the Rule of Law and the
Administrative State, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 15 (2013) ("Agency expertise
instead became a cover for agency delay or agency bias.").
185. Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of
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Even if its discretion with respect to enforcement cannot be
reviewed judicially, exercising that discretion creates a real
societal cost. It reduces the legal accountability of the IRS and
weakens the public's perception that the tax law is
administered subject to the rule of law. 186 Selective
enforcement of the tax law-even if legally permitted and
justified-hurts the IRS's reputation. 187 As the IRS exposes
itself to accusations of bias,18 8 those accusations can make the
IRS's tax collection and enforcement endeavors more difficult,
as it has to deal with an outraged public and skeptical
lawmakers. 189
The harms attendant to the IRS's failure to enforce the
campaigning prohibition do not just hobble the IRS's
enforcement activities: they could, potentially, have a negative
impact on church revenue as well. In 2006, Mark W. Everson,
then the Commissioner of the IRS, asserted, "the scourges of
technical manipulation and outright abuse that developed
some years ago in the profit-making sector of the economy are
now spreading to parts of the tax-exempt sector."1 90 If the
the Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829, 851 (2012). Professor Zelenak goes on to assert
that it is especially troubling if the IRS's ability to make taxpayer-favorable
changes to the tax law has "bred a disrespect for the rule of law on the part of the
Treasury and the IRS" in such a way that they believe they can disregard any
portion of the Code where it conflicts with their vision of "good tax policy." Id.
That is, although the IRS is using its discretion to benefit-rather than
persecute-particular groups of taxpayers, its selective disregard of tax provisions
nonetheless does systemic harm.
186. Though there is disagreement on what, exactly, constitutes the rule of
law, in its broadest sense, it means that those in power cannot arbitrarily wield
that power. See Peter M. Shane, The Rule of Law and the Inevitability of
Discretion, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 21 (2013).
187. See, e.g., Francis R. Hill, Auditing the NAACP: Misadventures in Tax
Administration, TAX NOTES TODAY 147-21 (2005) ("At its core, the NAACP
controversy arises from a combustible combination of a weak case on the merits
with a muscular administrative response which together fuel concern about
improper political influence on the Service in the closing days of a national
election marked by intense concerns about the integrity of the voting process.").
188. In 2004, for example, "the IRS was accused of selective enforcement with
regard to the political campaign ban." Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by
Churches and Charities:Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95
GEO. L.J. 1313, 1356 (2007).
189. See, e.g., TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES:
LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 19 (2014) ("Although
Congress regularly excoriated the IRS for its inadequacies, since the mid-1990s it
had denied the agency the resources needed to improve performance.").
190. Mark W. Everson, I.R.S. Comm'r, Remarks at the City Club of Cleveland,
Ohio (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.irs.gov/uaclRemarks-of-IRS-CommissionerMark.-W.-Everson-at-the-City-Club-of-Cleveland,-Ohio
[http://perma.cc/3DPQ-
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public became cognizant of these abuses, he continued, it would
lose faith in public charities and would "stop giving and those
in need will suffer."1 9 1
If the IRS enforces the campaigning prohibition against
churches, selecting the churches it will audit in an unbiased
manner, 192 it can demonstrate its willingness to enforce the tax
law. At the same time, it can undercut accusations of selective
enforcement, accusations that could be used to further cut its
funding or discourage the public from respecting and complying
with its administrative actions. Enforcement could further help
churches avoid losing the public's faith by encouraging them to
follow the (well-known) law as written.
A second reason why the IRS should begin enforcing the
campaigning prohibition as soon as practicable is that, by
enforcing the campaigning prohibition, the IRS would force
Congress to stand behind the law it has written. As a result of
the IRS's current nonenforcement, Congress can choose to
claim credit for the prohibition, to condemn it, or both,
depending solely on political expediency. The prohibition is in
place, but Congress has no incentive to investigate whether, as
a policy matter, the campaigning prohibition still makes
sense. 193 Academics have ceaselessly debated the wisdom and
constitutionality of the campaigning prohibition;1 9 4 activists
D6JC]. Most recently, those abuses include shady accounting practices by
putative cancer charities, intended to enrich the charities' officers at the expense
of both donors and cancer victims. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, 4 Cancer Charities Are
Accused of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2015, at Bl.
191. Everson, supra note 190; cf. Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1399, 1409-10 (2005) (noting that though the causal connection is not clear,
"[t]he results of the tax study suggest that exposure to reports of an unjust legal
outcome in a particular situation might lead to lower perceived fairness of the law
more generally, which in turn can lead to noncompliance with the law in the
future").
192. I discuss an easy way to find churches violating the campaigning
prohibition at low cost and without political bias infra notes 289-294 and
accompanying text.
193. Cf. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Revenue Costs of
NontraditionalREITs, 144 TAX NOTES 1103, 1107 (2014) ("Because REITs are not
getting the same scrutiny as the emotionally charged issue of corporate
inversions, Congress is unlikely to intervene except as part of tax reform-which
means nothing will happen anytime soon.").
194. Since 2001 alone, there have been dozens of law review articles
addressing the campaigning prohibition as it relates to churches. See, e.g.,
Nicholas P. Cafardi, Saving the Preachers:The Tax Code's Prohibitionon Church
Electioneering, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 503 (2012); Brunson, supra note 6; Leff, supra
note 59; Johnny Rex Buckles, Does the Constitutional Norm of Separation of
Church and State Justify the Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches that Engage in
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have argued and litigated for and against it;19 5 Congress has
even held hearings on the issue. 19 6
But Congress has not acted. Presumably, by reenacting the
campaigning prohibition in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,197
Congress signaled that it still considered the prohibition good
policy. Still, as a practical matter, the fact that the IRS has
consistently followed a policy of nonenforcement weakens the
presumption of congressional intent. It is equally possible that
members of Congress, aware that the IRS had virtually no
history of enforcing (and no incentive to enforce) the
campaigning prohibition, decided not to expend the political
capital it would require to reevaluate the benefits and costs of
the prohibition.
PartisanPolitical Speech?, 84 IND. L.J. 447 (2009); Keith S. Blair, Praying for a
Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and the Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax
Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 405 (2009); Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on
Participationin Political Campaigns by Charities Essential to Their Vitality and
Democracy? A Reply to Professor Tobin, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1057 (2008); Tobin,
supra note 188; Samansky, supra note 177; Vaughn E. James, The African.
American Church, PoliticalActivity, and Tax Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV.
371 (2007); Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith: Rethinking the Prohibition on
Political Campaign Intervention, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 298 (2007); Jennifer M.
Smith, Morse Code, Da Vinci Code, Tax Code and.. . Churches: An Historicaland
ConstitutionalAnalysis of Why Section 501(c)(3) Does Not Apply to Churches, 23
J.L. & POL. 41 (2007); Hatfield, supra note 19; Douglas H. Cook, The Politically
Active Church, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457 (2004); Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where
They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches Failed to Satisfy the
Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29 (2004); Ann M.
Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate-Never the Twain Shall Meet?,
1 PITT. TAX REV. 35 (2003); Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a
Rationale: What the Tax Code Prohibits;Why; To What End?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903
(2001); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis
of IRS Restrictions on the PoliticalActivities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 875 (2001).
195. For example, the Freedom From Religion Foundation sued the IRS to
force it to enforce the campaigning prohibition against churches, Freedom From
Religion Found., Inc. v. Shulman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 947, 954 (W.D. Wis. 2013), and
ultimately settled the suit upon the IRS's agreement to start looking into church
political campaigning. Press Release, FFRF, IRS Settle Suit over Church
Politicking, FREEDOM
FROM
RELIGION
FOUND.
(July
17,
2014),
http://ffrf.org/news/news-releases/item/20968-ffrf-irs-settle-suit-over-churchpoliticking [http://perma.cc/XY6M-ERNX]. Its efforts are countered by the ADF,
which encourages religions to flout what it asserts is an unconstitutional
condition the campaigning prohibition places on churches. Erik Eckholm, Legal
Alliance Gains Host of Court Victories for Conservative ChristianMovement, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2014, at A10.
196. See generally Review of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3)
Requirements for Religious Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. (2002).
197. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 2(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2095 (1986).
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If retaining the prohibition in 1986 did in fact signal
Congress's judgment that the campaigning prohibition is good
policy, the IRS's enforcement of the prohibition would align its
actions with Congress's desires. This could lead to less friction
between the two, as well as to better-functioning
administration of the tax law.1 9 8 If the IRS's nonenforcement
just enables Congress to ignore the prohibition, though, and
Congress does not stand behind its campaigning prohibition,
the IRS's enforcement could spur Congress to revisit the
wisdom of the campaigning prohibition. It could then make the
changes necessary to ensure that the rules governing taxexempt organizations better meet its current legislative
goals.1 99 In the end, whether or not Congress alters the
prohibition, even its careful reconsideration of the prohibition
has value. 200 If Congress actively reviewed the prohibition and
ultimately decided to keep it (or was politically unable to revise
it), its retention would signal to churches that Congress did, in
fact, intend the prohibition to apply to them. 20 1 Congress's
198. Congress and the IRS have an interdependent, if dysfunctional,
relationship: Congress needs the IRS to administer its tax laws and collect the
revenue government needs to function, while the IRS needs Congress to fund it
and authorize its activities. See Parnell, supra note 178, at 1360. As a result,
aligning the goals of the IRS with those of Congress will be beneficial to both the
IRS and Congress.
199. One viable approach to tax administration is for the IRS to enforce the
Code as written, even if taxpayers are using the literal language of the Code to
evade taxes. The IRS's faithful enforcement would "invite Congress to make its
intent clear by amending the statute." ROSTAIN & REGAN, supra note 189, at 31;
cf. Einer Elhauge, Preference-ElicitingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 2162, 2165 (2002) ("[W]hen enactable preferences are unclear, often the best
choice is instead a preference-eliciting default rule that is more likely to provoke a
legislative reaction that resolves the statutory indeterminacy and thus creates an
ultimate statutory result that reflects enactable political preferences more
accurately than any judicial estimate possibly could.").
200. Elhauge, supra note 199, at 2175 ("[W]hat matters is really not the
probability
of legislative
override
itself,
but
of serious
legislative
reconsideration.").
201. The signal would not be perfectly clear, of course. In truth, Congress
rarely overrides Supreme Court decisions. Between 1967 and 1990, Congress
overrode just 121 Supreme Court statutory decisions. William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331,
338 (1991). The rare override may occur because of a failure of the political
system, specifically, when the winning side cannot effectively lobby Congress
(because, for example, those who benefit are diffuse), or the Supreme Court is
attuned to current, rather than past, congressional preferences. Id. at 377-78.
Still, IRS enforcement of the campaigning prohibition, combined with a Supreme
Court decision on its constitutionality, represents the most likely manner of
forcing the current Congress to revisit the question of church campaigning. And,
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keeping the prohibition after careful reconsideration would also
tell churches that, like other tax-exempt organizations, they
need to abide by the campaigning prohibition if they want to
keep their tax exemption. 202
The third reason the IRS should begin enforcing the
campaigning prohibition is that IRS enforcement of the
prohibition would allow churches to put the question of its
constitutionality in front of the courts. In spite of the vast
literature regarding the constitutionality of the campaigning
prohibition as applied to churches, 20 3 scholars still argue over
whether it passes constitutional muster.20 4 Although the
constitutionality of the prohibition as applied to religious
organizations has been upheld by two federal appeals courts, 2 05

the Supreme Court has never considered the question. Because
of the Supreme Court's failure thus far to rule, and the
Clause
inherent
in
its
Establishment
uncertainty
jurisprudence, the prohibition's constitutionality remains
uncertain. Churches do not know whether they are bound by
the campaigning prohibition, or whether it represents an
unconstitutional limit on their free speech and their free
exercise of religion.
The uncertainty engendered by this open constitutional
question causes real harm to churches, even in the face of the
IRS's history of nonenforcement. While churches are aware
that the IRS has virtually never revoked a church's tax
exemption for supporting or opposing a candidate for office, 2 06
though rare, Congress does override Supreme Court statutory decisions.
202. As part of its 2004 PACI, the IRS ultimately revoked the exemptions of
five of the fifty-nine non-church tax-exempt entities it examined; four of the
revocations were for violating the campaigning prohibition. PACI REPORT, supra
note 53, at 5. Although it also examined forty-six churches, it did not revoke a
single church's exemption.
203. See supra note 194.
204. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 6, at 145-47 (describing arguments for and
against the constitutionality of the campaigning prohibition).
205. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856-57
(10th Cir. 1972) ("We hold that the limitations imposed by Congress in Section
501(c)(3) are constitutionally valid."); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137,
145 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("For the foregoing reasons, we find that the revocation of the
Church's tax-exempt status neither violated the Constitution nor exceeded the
IRS's statutory authority.").
206. Revocation is not impossible, of course. Four days before the 1992
presidential election, the Church at Pierce Creek placed full-page ads in USA
Today and the Washington Times encouraging readers to vote against Clinton.
Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 140. At the end of the ad, the Church solicited
"[t]ax-deductible donations for this advertisement." Id.
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the prohibition remains a condition for their exemption. 207
Moreover, as long as the tax law includes the prohibition, the
IRS could choose to enforce it in the future, or even enforce it
retroactively. 208 As a result, the constitutional uncertainty will
likely prevent risk-averse churches from expressly endorsing
candidates. The existence of the prohibition, whatever its
constitutional status, could even cause these risk-averse
churches to restrict their activities more than is necessary to
ensure that they do not accidentally violate the prohibition. 2 09
At the same time, aggressive churches will continue to flout the
prohibition, secure in the knowledge that they are unlikely to
2 10
face any repercussions from the IRS.

Though all tax-exempt churches should face the same
requirements to maintain their exemption, the IRS's
nonenforcement of a prohibition, which is enshrined in the tax
law, allows churches to essentially elect whether they will meet
the requirements for exemption or not. The ability of similarly
situated churches to choose whether to be bound by the
campaigning prohibition is unfair, and it violates the basic tax
policy principle of horizontal equity. 2 11 But without the IRS
actually revoking a church's tax exemption for violating the
campaigning prohibition, nobody will have standing to put the
question in front of the courts. 2 12
207. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
208. If the IRS has decided that it does not want to enforce the prohibition,
either because it does not want to expend the resources, it does not want any
public backlash, or because it believes that the provision is unconstitutional, it
would behoove the IRS to formally announce that policy. That formal
announcement would provide churches with some degree of protection from
retroactive enforcement; at the same time, it may demonstrate sufficient
abdication of its statutory responsibilities, sufficient to allow judicial intervention.
Treas. Reg. § 601.201(n)(6)(i) (as amended in 2002) ("The revocation or
modification may be retroactive if the organization omitted or misstated a
material fact, operated in a manner materially different from that originally
represented, or engaged in a prohibited transaction ....
209. Brunson, supra note 6, at 154-55.

210.

Id.

211. See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L
TAX J. 113, 113 (1990) ("The call for equity in taxation is generally taken to
include a rule of horizontal equity[,] . . . requiring equal treatment of equals, and
one of vertical equity[,] . . . [and] calling for an appropriate differentiation among
unequals.").
212. See Brunson, supra note 93, at 232-35. Of course, the IRS does not need to
revoke a church's tax exemption for the constitutionality question to become
justiciable. If the IRS were, instead, to penalize a church by imposing the excise
tax without simultaneously revoking its exemption, the church would have
standing to sue to challenge the constitutionality of the limitations on speech and
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In addition to nonenforcement's violation of horizontal
equity between churches, the ambiguity associated with the
campaigning prohibition neuters other benefits the prohibition
provides to churches. Many churches do not want to participate
in partisan politics. 2 13 The campaigning prohibition gives them
a backstop against pressure to participate-even if politicians
or parishioners want churches or their clergy to endorse or
oppose a candidate for office, the campaigning prohibition
provides churches and clergy with an excuse to recuse
themselves. 2 14 To the extent that everybody knows that the
IRS will not enforce the prohibition, though, the power of
churches' excuse is diminished. Without the IRS acting, in
other words, the unfairness that churches currently face will
not end without any offsetting benefits to the churches.
Providing churches with standing to sue, however, imposes
a real cost to the IRS, both in terms of money and time. 2 15 And
the benefits to the IRS of allowing churches to litigate the
constitutionality of the campaigning prohibition are less
obvious. But such litigation does benefit the IRS. The
resolution of the question would provide certainty not just to
churches, but to the IRS itself. It has purportedly settled the
free exercise. But, while imposing an excise tax would permit judicial challenge to
the overall regime, it does not respond to the other two reasons to begin enforcing
the prohibition. If the IRS allows a noncompliant church to keep its exemptioneven if it imposes the excise tax-the IRS fails in its duty to enforce the law as
written. See supra Section II.C. Moreover, it does not force Congress to stand
behind the regime that it has enacted and maintained over the course of six
decades.
213. See, e.g., Sue E. S. Crawford & Laura R. Olson, Choices and Consequences
in Context, in CHRISTIAN CLERGY IN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 173, at 230
("[M]any religious traditions have long applied strong normative pressure against
explicitly partisan talk by clergy. . . ."). While approximately 1,500 pastors
participated in Pulpit Freedom Sunday in 2012, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text, that is a small fraction of the estimated 46,510 clergy in the
United States in May, 2013. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT
AND
WAGES MAY 2014 at
11
(Mar. 25,
2015),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdflocwage.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3ZA-B35L].
214. Crawford & Olson, supra note 213, at 230 ("This legal context provides a
concrete reason for clergy to steer clear of party-oriented politics and focus instead
on issue-oriented politics.").
215. The IRS is involved in all litigation arising out of the federal income tax.
Attorneys in the IRS Office of Chief Counsel litigate in the Tax Court. Roberta
Mann, Chief Counsel's Subtle Impact on Revenue: Regulations, Litigation, and
Administrative Guidance, 65 NAT'L TAX J. 889, 893-94 (2012). Even when the
Department of Justice actually litigates tax cases, though, the Office of Chief
Counsel stays involved and works with the Department of Justice attorneys. Id. at
894.
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Freedom From Religion Foundation's recent lawsuit by
agreeing to enforce the campaigning prohibition against
churches. 2 16 To some extent, its enforcement strategy will
depend on the ultimate constitutionality of the campaigning
prohibition as applied to churches. In the meantime, to protect
its reputation as unbiased and dedicated to the rule of law, 2 17
the IRS needs an apolitical, neutral, and fair way to select test
cases. Pulpit Freedom Sunday provides the IRS with just such
an apolitical, neutral, and fair method to choose test cases. By
revoking the exemptions of Pulpit Freedom Sunday participant
churches while simultaneously explaining what it is doing and
why, the IRS can open the gate to a judicial determination of
the campaigning prohibition's constitutionality. Moreover, in
opening the gate this way, it will do the least harm to itself
while providing for the certainty churches and the tax system
need.

V.

EFFECTS ON CHURCHES OF REVOCATION

The churches involved in Pulpit Freedom Sunday
rightfully see little risk in their participation. No church has
ever lost its exemption for participation in Pulpit Freedom
Sunday. 2 18 Moreover, although the IRS has allegedly agreed to
begin enforcing the campaigning prohibition against churches,
it has also delayed the implementation of its enforcement. 2 19 It
has also not described what its enforcement would look like.
Unless and until the IRS credibly signals that it will robustly
enforce the campaigning prohibition, churches can reasonably
expect the status quo to extend into the foreseeable future. The
IRS's past actions have signaled clearly that enforcing the
campaigning prohibition, at least against churches, is such a
low priority that they can effectively ignore the tax law.
Even if churches believed that the IRS would enforce the
216. See supra note 195.
217. See supra notes 184-189 and accompanying text.
218. Adelle M. Banks, Religious, Secular Advocates Seek Clarity on IRS Rules
for Endorsements, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 1, 2015, 9:59 AM) ("There's [sic] been
no prosecutions to date" for participating in Pulpit Freedom Sunday.),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/01/religious-irs-endorsementrules n 6579864.html [http://perma.cc/UL4R-F7AF].
219. Kate Tracy, IRS to Atheists: Okay, We'll Investigate Pulpit Freedom
Sunday Pastors, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (July 25,
2014,
11:33 AM),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2014/july/irs-to-atheists-okay-wellinvestigate-pulpit-freedom-sunday.html [http://perma.cc/LHK3-CHV2].
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campaigning
prohibition,
presumably
many participant
churches would still be willing to risk the loss of their
exemption. By participating in Pulpit Freedom Sunday, these
churches have already demonstrated that the right to endorse
a candidate for office is important to them; moreover, even if
they believe that the IRS might revoke their exemptions, they
could reasonably believe that their loss of exemption would not
affect them in any substantive manner. On its website, the
ADF assures churches that they face little risk in
participating. 220 It admits that the IRS could impose an excise
tax, but that excise tax would "be difficult for the IRS to
calculate and would probably not be very great in amount." 22 1
Further, the ADF assures potential participant churches that
"a church may [at worst] lose its tax exempt status for a very
short time period, and [that] even if a church's tax exempt
501(c)(3) letter is revoked, a church may once again be
automatically considered tax exempt under the tax code if it
agrees to abide by section 501(c)(3)." 222
This Part will first describe the limited economic harm
churches would face as a result of losing their exemptions. It
will then explain why, in spite of that minimal harm, the
threat of losing their exemptions would motivate churches to
comply with the prohibition. Next it will address how a church
might have its exemption reinstated. Finally, it will explain
how merely tempering the penalty for violating the
campaigning prohibition would not solve the constitutional
question raised by the prohibition itself.
A.

FinancialImpact of the Loss of Exemption

Irrespective of the financial impact, churches would be
loath to lose their tax exemption. Churches see their taxexempt status as "essential to their ability to accomplish their
religious and ethical obligations," 223 and they view the risk of
losing their exemptions for engaging in what they view as
protected speech as "fundamentally repugnant." 224 In many

220. Pulpit Freedom Sunday FAQ, supra note 20.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Wyatt McDowell, How Religious Organizations and Churches Can Be
Politically Correct, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 71, 77 (2003).
224. Dessingue, supra note 194, at 920.
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ways, though, a church's loss of exemption would do more
symbolic than financial harm. Ultimately, the impact of a loss
of the deductibility of donations made by the church's donors
would be limited by the fact that many church donors do not
itemize and thus are not sensitive to such loss of
deductibility. 225
The tax law provides that donors to public charities,
including churches, can deduct the amount of their donations
in calculating their tax liability.22 6 Deductibility means that
the federal government effectively subsidizes a donor's
contribution by reducing the real cost of that contribution to
the donor. 22 7 But because charitable donations are an itemized
donation, only donors who itemize their deductions benefit
from the subsidy. 2 28 Approximately one-third of taxpayers
itemize their deductions, 229 and higher-income taxpayers are
far more likely than lower-income taxpayers to itemize their
deductions. 230 Although it is difficult to determine what
percentage of church donors itemize, lower-income taxpayers
tend to "favor religious organizations in making their
charitable contributions." 23 1 Even though studies have
demonstrated that charitable giving is price elastic, 232 nonitemizing donors effectively bear the full cost of their
donations. The price of donating will not change for these
donors merely because the church loses its exemption, and
their donations would likely remain constant.
In addition, churches themselves will see very little change
in their tax bills. Churches must already pay taxes at ordinary
corporate rates on unrelated business income that they earn. 233
At the same time, exempt or not, churches would not include
donations in their taxable income. 234 Like any other tax-

225. Faulhaber, supra note 29, at 1322 ("[T]he vast majority of taxpayers were
not able to take the charitable deduction.").
226. I.R.C. § 170(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-49).
227. Faulhaber, supra note 29, at 1318.
228. Id. at 1321.
229. Brunson, supra note 6, at 164.
230. Id. at 165.
231. Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution
Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843, 846 (2001).
232. Faulhaber, supra note 29, at 1319.
233. I.R.C. § 511(a) (2012).
234. Donations to churches (or other charitable organizations) should be
characterized as gifts; as gifts, they are not taxable to the recipient, whether or
not the recipient is exempt from taxation. Id. § 102(a) (2012).
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exempt organization, churches that engage in active businesses
already pay taxes on the income they earn from their active
businesses. 235 The principal difference a church would face if it
lost its exemption would be that it would have to pay taxes on
its passive income, if any. If a church had a significant
endowment, or otherwise invested significant funds in financial
assets, it could see its tax liability increase from its loss of
exemption.
Even given the marginal economic costs to churches of
losing their tax exemptions, enforcing the campaigning
prohibition against churches would likely lead to more
compliance by churches. The IRS believes that publicizing its
successful tax enforcement constitutes an important means of
deterring others from violating the tax law. 236 Even if it wanted
to robustly enforce the campaigning prohibition, the IRS lacks
the ability to audit every church for compliance. 2 37 As a result,
if the IRS wants to encourage churches that would violate the
campaigning prohibition to comply with it instead, the IRS
must magnify the impact of the enforcement actions it does
undertake. If the IRS's intuition about publicity is correct,
successfully revoking some churches' exemptions-and
publicizing the fact that they have been revoked-would
discourage other churches from violating the campaigning
prohibition.
Some empirical evidence indicates that disclosing tax
enforcement against certain taxpayers deters other taxpayers
from violating the tax law. 2 38 This empirical evidence does not
speak precisely to the situation churches face, but focuses
235. Id. § 511(a) (imposing corporate income tax on tax-exempt entities'
unrelated business taxable income).
236. Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?,
30 VA. TAX REV. 1, 21-22 (2010).
237. For individuals, the overall audit rate in 2013 was less than one percent.
Laura Saunders, Are You Ready to Be Audited?, WALL STREET J., Mar. 15, 2014,
at B7. And the IRS faces significantly more constraints on auditing churches than
it does on auditing individuals. To audit a church, the IRS must comply with
restrictive permission, notice, and duration requirements. I.R.C. § 7611(b), (d)
(2012).
238. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities
and Taxpayer Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500, 502 (2007) (finding that
criminal enforcement has a measurable effect on other taxpayers' voluntary
compliance with the tax law); ALAN H. PLUMLEY, THE DETERMINANTS OF
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: ESTIMATING THE IMPACTS OF TAX POLICY,
ENFORCEMENT, AND IRS RESPONSIVENESS 36 (1996), www.irs.gov/pub/irssoilpubl916b.pdf [http://perma.cc/CF7H-4X5Q].
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instead on criminal penalties against individuals. Because only
one or two churcheS 2 39 have lost their exemption as a result of
violating the campaigning prohibition, it would be impossible
to construct a reliable empirical study precisely on point. But
the evidence at least suggests that enforcing the campaigning
prohibition against some churches would encourage other
churches to comply with the prohibition, even if their risk of
audit were minimal.
Seeing other churches lose their tax exemptions may even
have more deterrent power than the imposition of a fine. As
Professor Joshua Blank points out, taxpayers face certain
cognitive biases, including loss aversion and the endowment
effect. 24 0 In general, potential losses are more salient to
individuals than potential gains. 24 1 This strong aversion to
losses "leads to the endowment effect, which causes them to
develop attachments to items they own and a reluctance to part
with them."24 2 Together, loss aversion and the endowment
effect suggest that the threat of losing its exemptionsomething a church already has, and already values-would be
a particularly salient penalty. As such, evidence that
campaigning could lead to a church's loss of exemption should
create more deterrence than its expected likelihood would
indicate.
Failure to enforce the campaigning prohibition, on the
other hand, would presumably continue to weaken the
obligation that churches feel to refrain from endorsing
candidates for office. 24 3 As more churches begin to flout the tax
law, their noncompliance can reduce the taxpaying public's
belief in the fair enforcement of the tax law, which, in turn,
risks flipping the taxpayers' norm of voluntary compliance into
a norm of noncompliance.244
239. See supra note 9 (Branch Ministries lost its exemption for campaigning, as
did Christian Echoes, though it is not clear from the case whether Christian
Echoes was a church or a religious organization).
240. Joshua D. Blank, Collateral Compliance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 719, 752
(2014).
241. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 284 (2011).
242. Blank, supra note 240.
243. The weakening obligation can be illustrated by looking at the explosion in
the number of participants in Pulpit Freedom Sunday. Only thirty-three churches
participated in the first Pulpit Freedom Sunday in 2008. Brunson, supra note 6,
at 150. By 2014-a midterm, not a presidential, election year-that number had
skyrocketed to more than 1,600 participating churches. Bade, supra note 11.
244. Eric Kroh, U.S. Seen in Danger of Tumbling Over "Compliance Cliff," 144
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B. ReinstatingIts Exemption
The ADF's assertion that churches will only lose their
exemption for a short period of time, and that they can
automatically become exempt again once they comply with
section 501(c)(3), has become conventional wisdom. 24 5 The
conventional wisdom appears to have originated in the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti.24 6 In that

case, the court found that the IRS's revocation of Branch
Ministries' tax exemption did not violate the Constitution or
exceed the IRS's authority. 2 47 On its way to this conclusion, the
court stated in dicta that the Code's "unique treatment of
churches"-that is, the fact that churches are automatically
exempt from taxation without needing to file an
application 248-meant that any harm from revocation was more
illusory than real. 249 The court based its assumption on the
IRS's oral assurance that "if the Church does not intervene in
future political campaigns, it may hold itself out as a 501(c)(3)
organization and receive all the benefits of that status."2 5 0
It is not clear, though, that the court and the IRS were
correct. Nothing in the Code or Treasury regulations explains
the process that a public charity must follow to become taxexempt again after losing its exemption as the result of
campaigning. However, the regulations and the IRS have laid
out procedures for a public charity to regain its exemption
where that exemption was lost for other reasons. Those
procedures may provide at least some guidance.
Most tax-exempt organizations must file an annual
information return with the IRS. 25 1 A tax-exempt organization
that fails to file its return for three consecutive years has its
exemption automatically revoked. 2 52 An organization that
TAx NOTES 909, 909 (2014).
245. Even I have made that assertion in a prior article. See Brunson, supra
note 6, at 132 ("Because the harm of a church's losing its exemption is more
symbolic than substantive, the harm to the church of participating in a political
campaign is more illusory than the very real harms suffered by a nonchurch
public charity.").

246.

211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 145.
I.R.C. § 508(c)(1) (2012).
Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 142.
Id.

251.

I.R.C. § 6033(a)(1) (2012).
Id. § 6033(j)(1).

252.
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wants its exemption reinstated after its failure to file must
apply for the reinstatement, even if it did not have to formally
25 3
Churches, of
apply for tax exemption in the first place.
course, cannot have their exemptions revoked for failure to file
because the tax law exempts them from the annual filing
requirement. 254 But this provision belies the idea that just
because an organization did not originally need to file an
application for exemption, it would not need to file an
application to have its exemption reinstated.
While neither the Code nor the regulations lay out the
reinstatement process after a loss of exemption for violating
the campaigning prohibition, they are not silent on public
charities' political involvement. The Code allows certain public
charities (though not churches) to elect out of the prohibition
2 55
on spending a substantial part of its activities lobbying.
Rather than the hazy "no substantial part" standard, these
public charities can elect to limit their political expenditures to
a "lobbying ceiling amount." 2 56 If an electing public charity's
political expenditures exceed this ceiling amount, it loses its
exemption. 2 57 To regain its exemption, a disqualified public
charity must reapply, and cannot even reapply until the year
2 58
following its loss of exemption at the earliest.
an
neither process for reinstating
To be clear,
organization's tax exemption is directly applicable to a public
charity that loses its exemption for violating the campaigning
prohibition, whether or not that public charity is a church. But
they collectively indicate that a church could be required to
formally apply to have its exemption reinstated, even though it
did not originally need to apply for an exemption. Additionally,
they suggest that a church could conceivably face a waiting
period before it becomes exempt again.
In fact, it seems likely that churches must follow whatever
procedure governs other organizations that wish to have their
tax exemptions reinstated. 259 In the first place, the law does

253.

Id. § 6033(j)(2).

254.

Id. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i).
.

255. Id. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (providing that to qualify under section 501(c)(3), an
organization must ensure that "no substantial part of [its] activities ... is. .
attempting[] to influence legislation").
256. Id. § 501(h)(1).
257. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)-3(b)(1) (2014).

258.

Id. § 1.501(h)-3(d)(1).

259.

The Code

is surprisingly silent about how a

formerly tax-exempt
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not explicitly state that churches can follow a different
procedure than other public charities for reinstating their
exemption. 26 0 While it does not lay out a specific process for
other public charities, either, without a specific provision
stating that churches are treated differently, they should follow
the same rules as non-church public charities.
In the second place, the constitutionality of providing an
easier process for churches to reinstate their exemptions is, at
best, questionable. The First Amendment allows permissive
accommodation of religion, but the Establishment Clause
circumscribes
the
breadth
of
that
permissive
26
accommodation. 1 The Establishment Clause, according to the
Supreme Court, prohibits the government from enacting
policies intended to favor religion. 26 2 That does not mean, of
course, that government policies cannot benefit religion, as
long as the benefits it provides are merely incidental 2 63 or are
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 2 64
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence is largely incoherent. 265 As a result, it is unclear

organization regains its exemption. Still, it seems unlikely that any organization
that loses its exemption for violating the campaigning prohibition can
automatically become tax-exempt again solely by beginning to comply with the
prohibition. More likely, it must reapply with the IRS for an exemption.
260. The Code does provide one difference between churches that lose their
exemptions for violating the campaigning prohibition and other public charities
that lose their exemptions for the same reason: other public charities cannot
subsequently be treated as exempt under section 501(c)(4). § 504(a) (2012).
Churches, however, are exempt from this limitation and, presumably, could
become exempt under section 501(c)(4). Id. § 504(c). Though this provision does
not necessarily indicate a congressional opinion on whether churches that lost
their exemption should be able to instantly regain their exemption, if churches
could, the exception in section 504 would be unnecessary. Without any friction
between losing its exemption and regaining its exemption, a church would have
little need to shift its exemption from section 501(c)(3) to section 501(c)(4).
261. Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions
from the ContraceptionMandate:An UnconstitutionalAccommodation of Religion,

49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 356-57 (2013).
262. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
263. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
264. Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 261, at 356.
265. Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment
Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 628 (2011) ("The [Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause] jurisprudence therefore appears partial and incoherent both to
religionists and nonreligionists."); Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment
Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) ("One of the few things constitutional
scholars of every stripe seem to agree about is the proposition that the Court's
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whether the Court would find that permitting the automatic
and instant reinstatement of a church's tax exemption violated
the Establishment Clause. It is, however, within the realm of
possibility. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, the
Supreme Court held that granting tax exemptions to churches
presents no constitutional infirmities. 2 66 The Court noted that
the Establishment Clause was not implicated in that case
because the state had not "singled out one particular church or
religious group or even churches as such; rather, it has granted
exemption to all houses of religious worship within a broad
class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations
which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific,
professional, historical, and patriotic groups." 26 7
If churches get special fast-track treatment in reinstating
their exemptions, though, the benefits of that special treatment
are available solely to churches as such. And, while the
Supreme Court did not hold in Walz that such treatment
violated the Establishment Clause, it left the door open for
such a conclusion. 268 Subsequent to its decision in Walz, the
Supreme Court has held that a tax exemption available solely
to religious publications violated the Establishment Clause. 269
In large part, the Supreme Court disallowed the sales tax
exemption
because
it
"burden[ed]
nonbeneficiaries
markedly." 2 70 What was the burden imposed? By reducing the
sales tax obligation on these religious publications, the state
increased the amount of sales tax others would bear. 27 1 The
incoherence of Establishment Clause jurisprudence prevents us
from knowing whether allowing churches to regain their
exemptions immediately and automatically, while imposing
some administrative obligations on non-church exempt
organizations, is constitutional or not. But there is at least a
real possibility that such special treatment presents an
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is an incoherent mess."). Gedicks and Van
Tassell assert that there are at least some rays of order within the chaos of the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence: they assert that the court has
consistently held that permissive accommodations that protect religion at the
expense of non-religion violate the Establishment Clause. See Gedicks & Van
Tassell, supra note 261, at 357.

266.

397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 673.
Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 261, at 358.
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Establishment Clause problem.
C. Why Not Just Change the Penalty?
No matter the actual financial harm to churches, though,
there is no denying the symbolic violence that revoking a
church's tax exemption would do. There is nothing inevitable
about the Code's current penalty for tax-exempt organizations
that violate the campaigning prohibition. Moreover, the current
penalty-loss of exemption-potentially creates significant
problems, both for the IRS and for churches themselves. For
the IRS, the draconian nature of the prescribed penalty almost
certainly prevents it from enforcing the campaigning
prohibition. 272

Meanwhile, even if the campaigning prohibition were to be
enforced against churches, it would likely affect each church
differently. Wealthier churches, which can afford legal advice,
would find it easy to avoid violating the prohibition. If the
wealthy church wanted to endorse a candidate, its legal
advisors could provide it with a good idea of where the line
between permissible and impermissible fell, and the church
could approach that line without crossing it.
A poorer church that felt a similar moral obligation would
face a much more difficult conundrum. Lacking the resources
to obtain sophisticated legal advice, the church would have to
figure out for itself where the permissible limits fell. Without a
clear vision of the line separating permissible from
impermissible campaign intervention, poorer churches would
need to restrict their political actions more than richer
churches, or face the very real risk of losing their exemptions
for violating the campaigning prohibition.
Congress could easily resolve the scope of this problem by
altering the penalty structure applicable to violators.
Commentators have suggested alternatives to the current
regime. For example, the law could require churches that wish
to endorse candidates to create a parallel entity that must pay
taxes on its income and cannot accept deductible donations. 27 3

272. Blair-Stanek, supra note 167, at 1200 ("Status-loss is often a draconian
remedy, and the IRS hesitates to impose it.").
273. See Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposalfor Peaceful
Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 352 (1990). Professor Benjamin Leff
argues that something like this-some method of allowing tax-exempt
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Alternatively, it could introduce some sort of intermediate
penalty that is less draconian than the loss of exemption. For
example, the tax law could allow the IRS to impose a penalty in
lieu of disqualification, or it could disallow a portion of the
deduction that donors to the church could otherwise enjoy. 274
Currently, though, Congress has no reason to change the
law. Members of Congress can hide behind the IRS's
nonenforcement to play either side of the issue. Some can
inflame their constituents with stories of the IRS's violation of
churches' Free Exercise rights while others can assure their
constituents that the law prevents churches from using
untaxed money to get candidates elected. 2 75
But the impediments to congressional improvement of the
prohibition are not merely political. If prohibiting churches
from campaigning on behalf of or against candidates for office
violates the Constitution, then the method Congress uses to
prevent it is irrelevant. Even an intermediate penalty would be
an unconstitutional restraint on a church's Free Exercise. To
arrive at a place where looking at an intermediate penalty
makes sense, then, the courts need to resolve the constitutional
controversy.
VI. REVOCATION
As a legal matter, the IRS can choose not to enforce the
campaigning prohibition; as a normative matter, it should not
make that choice. The policy considerations outlined in the
Supreme Court's recognition of wide agency discretion apply, if
at all, only in the weakest manner here. At the same time,
failure to enforce the campaigning prohibition against churches
negatively impacts horizontal equity considerations, and may
reduce taxpayers' respect for, and compliance with, the tax law.
Of course, the IRS is currently in an awkward position to
start enforcing the campaigning prohibition. Although the
campaigning prohibition entered the tax law in 1954, the IRS
has only revoked two churches' exemptions for violating the

organizations to exercise their speech rights-is necessary to avoid requiring the
IRS to pursue a "constitutionally problematic enforcement strategy." Leff, supra
note 59, at 728-29.
274. See Brunson, supra note 6, at 158-59.
275. See supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
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prohibition. 2 76 It would be absurd to believe that, during the
past six decades, only two churches violated the prohibition. In
fact, it would be doubly absurd because the thousands of
churches that have participated in Pulpit Freedom Sunday
have expressly and intentionally violated the prohibition and
have, in fact, confessed as much to the IRS. 2 77 Still, nothing
has changed between the last Pulpit Freedom Sunday and
today that would demand an IRS crackdown.
While nothing has changed with regard to the
campaigning prohibition, the political climate facing the IRS
has changed. Between 2010 and 2012, some conservative
groups alleged that the IRS improperly targeted them, delaying
or denying their applications for tax exemption under I.R.C.
section 501(c)(4). 27 8 Whether or not the IRS was improperly
targeting conservative organizations, 279 it clearly reacted
poorly. 280 As fallout, the IRS has faced hostile congressional
hearings 2 8 1 and, to the extent it had any sympathy from
taxpayers, it has managed to lose that.2 82 Already scandalridden and unpopular, the timing appears horrible for revoking
churches' tax exemptions. Not only is the IRS targeting

276. See Brunson, supra note 6, at 135; see also supra note 9.
277. Bade, supra note 11.
278. See Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax
Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115, 120 (2013); Donald B. Tobin, The Internal
Revenue Service and a Crisis of Confidence: A New RegulatoryApproach for a New
Era, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 429, 463 (2014).
279. The TIGTA report found that the IRS did use improper criteria in
selecting applications for a more rigorous examination, resulting in added delays
for conservative groups. TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE USED TO IDENTIFY TAX
EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW (2013), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/audit
reports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf [http://perma.cc/7R74-8GY3]. Others have
debated the inappropriateness, pointing out that liberal political groups were also
caught up in the more-extensive reviews. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, The IRS Tea Party
Controversy and Administrative Discretion, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 41, 43
(2013) ("It has since come to light that the IRS targeted conservative political
groups, liberal political groups, and a variety of other groups for heightened
scrutiny, although the TIGTA Report omitted these facts.").
280. See, e.g., Joseph J. Thorndike, New Analysis: Stop Blaming the IRS for
Problems It Didn't Create, 144 TAX NOTES 115, 115 (2014) ("The agency's
performance during the Tea Party scandal has been defensive, dilatory, and less
than fully honest.").
281. See, e.g., Josh Hicks, IRS E-mail Hearings Get Dramatic, WASH. POST,
Jun. 25, 2014, at A17.
282. Thorndike, supra note 280, at 115 ("Last month it obliterated any
remaining sympathy when it confessed to 'losing' former official Lois Lerner's emails.").
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conservative political groups, its opponents could proclaim, but

it is also targeting churches in the exercise of their First
Amendment speech!
As a result, the IRS should not merely implement a largescale enforcement of the campaigning prohibition. Instead, it
needs to coordinate its enforcement approach, explaining to
both churches and the American public why it is choosing to
begin enforcing a provision of the tax law that it has mostly
ignored for the last six decades. In addition, it needs to clearly
signal that it is not selecting churches for revocation based on
their political or religious ideology, but instead has
preemptively tied its hands in terms of criteria for selecting
which churches it will investigate. To achieve these goals, this
Article will provide a template the IRS can use in its pursuit of
churches violating the campaigning prohibition.
A.

Selection Criteria

To the extent possible, the IRS should avoid further
alienating the taxpaying public. It is in nobody's interest to
have a tax collector hamstrung by massive unpopularity. 2 83
The National Taxpayer Advocate found that distrust of the
federal government and of the IRS correlated with low tax
compliance.284
Moreover, the IRS has a history of allowing itself to be
used for political ends. The recent Tea Party scandal, whether
or not it reflects true politicking by the IRS, at least projects an
appearance of political bias. And the Tea Party scandal is not
the only time the IRS has faced allegations of political bias. In
2004, when the IRS investigated All Saints Episcopal Church
after its pastor allegedly used his sermon to oppose the
reelection of George Bush, some commentators accused the IRS

283. In 2013, Gallup found that 42% of Americans thought the IRS was doing a
poor job, as opposed to 27% who thought it was doing an excellent or a good job.
Jeffrey M. Jones & Lydia Saad, Americans Sour on IRS, Rate CDC and FBI Most
Positively, GALLUP (May 23, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162764/americansviews-irs-sharply-negative-2009.aspx
[http://perma.cc/9XHJ-V7TV].
Moreover,
Americans' confidence in the IRS has been trending downward over the last
several years. See id.
284. NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
VOL. 2: TAS RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 5 (2012), http://www.taxpayer
advocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/9T

XC-C9V9].
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of "politics of intimidation." 2 85 The Kennedy Administration
was accused of using the IRS to attack tax-exempt
organizations, 2 86 and Richard Nixon tried to use the IRS to
intimidate his enemies. 28 7 In fact, "[t]here is no lack of
anecdotal evidence suggesting that Congress and the President
both have used their political influence to bend the IRS to their
own partisan purposes." 288
Given the IRS's history and the scrutiny under which it
operates, it is essential that it not appear to be acting in a
partisan manner when it revokes church tax exemptions. An
easy way that the IRS can stand apart from politics is to limit
its ability to choose which churches to investigate. Pulpit
Freedom Sunday provides the IRS with an easy method for
limiting its discretion. Rather than looking through news
reports 2 89 and complaints by aggrieved parties, the IRS can
look at those churches that expressly intend to violate the
campaigning prohibition and send their sermons to the IRS as
evidence that they have violated the prohibition. 2 90 Moreover,
285. Vincent J. Schodolski, PoliticalSermons Stir Up the IRS: Effort to Enforce
Tax-Exempt Rules or Bid to Bully Pulpits?, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 20, 2005),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-11-20/news/0511200326_1_tax-exemptstatus-los-angeles-tax-attorney-government-entities- division [http://perma.cc/D7R

D-8R3A].
286. David J. Herzig, Justice For All: Reimagining the Internal Revenue
Service, 33 VA. TAX REV. 23, 26 (2013).
287. Marilyn Young et al., The Political Economy of the IRS, 13 ECON. & POL.
201, 204 (2001).
288. Id.
289. The IRS has historically been known to look for potential tax violations in
newspapers, among other sources. See, e.g., Mark A. Muntean, Letter to the
Editor, Preserving the Saints: IRS vs. All Saints Church, 109 TAX NOTES 1691,
1691 (2005) ("Every time I tell a client about this method of IRS investigation,
they always seem surprised, which surprises me. The IRS, or rather IRS
employees, read the newspaper. . . ."); Richard E. Sympson, Taxation of
Contingent Legal Fees on Settlements or Awards, 3 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 170,
198-99 (2003) ("The IRS audit guide suggests that the auditors comb through
newspaper articles because 'large punitive damage verdicts generally make
headlines."').
290. Enforcing the prohibition against self-reporting churches should be
constitutionally permissible. In the 1980s, the U.S. government took a passive
enforcement approach toward individuals who refused to register with
the Selective Service. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 601
(1985). Essentially, the government only prosecuted individuals who reported
themselves as having violated the law. Id. David Alan Wayte, who was prosecuted
for his failure to register, objected that such selective prosecution violated his
First and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 604. The Supreme Court held that the
government had the prosecutorial discretion to take this passive approach and
indict only those who were brought to its attention. Id. at 614. If the government
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beyond a cursory examination of the sermons to ensure that
the sermon did, in fact, endorse or oppose a candidate for office,
the IRS should explicitly waive its discretion to decide whether
the violation was sufficient to warrant the loss of exemption. 29 1
Because Congress wrote the campaigning prohibition as a
strict liability rule, the IRS should enforce it as such. 2 92 By

limiting its discretion in choosing what churches to investigate,
and in making revocation essentially automatic, the IRS can
credibly advertise that it was not engaged in a partisan witch
hunt, but rather was enforcing the Code neutrally, as
written. 293
can constitutionally choose to criminally prosecute only those who bring their
violation of the law to the government's attention, there should be no
constitutional defect in using the same passive approach in a civil context.
291. It is not always clear whether a church or other tax-exempt public charity
has violated the campaigning prohibition. On the margins, there can always be
ambiguity. For example, a church's publication and distribution of the voting
records of Congress does not violate the campaigning prohibition as long as it does
not editorialize. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154. But if it publishes the same
voting records, along with its position on the underlying issues, it may violate the
prohibition. Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-41 I.R.B. 7. But Pulpit Freedom Sunday
sermons generally do not present this ambiguity, intended, as they are, to violate
the prohibition. As a result, simply using these sermons allows the IRS to
materially reduce its search costs, and ensures clean cases should the courts
become involved.
292. Section 501(c)(3) says simply that an organization does not qualify as
exempt if it participates in "any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
to) any candidate for public office." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). Congress did not
require that the organization or its representatives have any particular state of
mind to fail to qualify as exempt.
293. It may be that there is a strong ideological bent to the churches that
participate in Pulpit Freedom Sunday. That is, it is clearly possible that the
majority will endorse the Republican candidate or that the majority will endorse
the Democratic candidate. However, if the IRS explicitly proscribes its selection
and penalty discretion, opponents of the IRS will not be able to accuse the IRS of
bias in its enforcement, especially if the IRS does not know, in advance of Pulpit
Freedom Sunday, the precise churches that intend to participate. The IRS could
limit any structural bias, of course. Rather than revoking the elections of all of the
violative participants in Pulpit Freedom Sunday, it could simply create a balanced
case by revoking the election of one liberal and one conservative church. And, if
creating a test case were the sole goal, this would be an easy way to go about it.
But selecting two churches on either side of the political spectrum violates other
considerations raised in this Article. For one thing, it increases the IRS's
enforcement costs. Rather than simply reviewing the sermons it passively
received to determine if they contained a political endorsement, the IRS would
need to actually search out violators. After identifying churches that had violated
the prohibition, the IRS would need to determine whether the churches were
politically liberal or conservative, which would require more work and the
expenditure of more resources on the IRS's part. Finally, explicitly determining
the political bent of churches would require the IRS to explicitly enter the political
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B. Public Explanations
The IRS should engage in systemic public relations and
pronouncements as it revokes the tax exemptions of any Pulpit
Freedom Sunday churches that violate the campaigning
prohibition. Absent some sort of concurrent publicity, one can
easily imagine members of Congress scapegoating the IRS to
win points with their constituencies. 294 Although the IRS's
revocation of churches' tax exemption is mandated by the
Code-a law enacted by Congress-members of Congress have,
in the past, been happy to blame the IRS for unpopular tax
laws. 295 There is no reason to believe that, upon the revocation
of church tax exemptions, Congress would suddenly shoulder
the blame voluntarily. 296
Congress's historic unwillingness to take responsibility for
its tax legislation provides an opportunity to the IRS in this
case. In spite of its broad unpopularity, the IRS is not the least
popular group in Washington, D.C. In July 2014, Gallup found
that just fifteen percent of Americans approved of the way
Congress was doing its job. 297 Congress, then, has an approval
rating approximately twelve percentage points below that of
the IRS. Americans already believe bad things about Congress;
arena, and specifically target churches for their political leanings, the appearance
of which could be politically disastrous for the IRS. See supra notes 278-282 and
accompanying text.
294. And Congress is not the only group willing to scapegoat the IRS to score
political points. On its website advertising Pulpit Freedom Sunday, the ADF
writes, "The IRS continues to threaten that it will decide what can be said from
America's pulpits. There are two ways to stop this: Congress fixes it, or courts
strike it down." Pulpit Freedom Sunday, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM,
[http://perma.cc/CL6Hhttp://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/pulpitfreedom

CU2A].
295. See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers. of Symbolic Legislation:
Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413,
477 n.281 (1999) ("For instance, Senators and Representatives vote to add new
incentives, subsidies, anti-abuse rules, exemptions, transitional rules, and
obscurities to the law-then thunder against the complexity of the 'IRS Code,' as
if the IRS, not Congress, enacted those complexities."); Thorndike, supra note 280,
at 115 ("[Lawmakers are] using the IRS investigation to avoid blame for a
problem that Congress created in the first place.").
296. Because losses tend to be more salient to taxpayers than gains,
policymakers have a strong motivation to minimize blame, even if their blameminimization strategies also limit the amount of credit they can claim. See R.
Kent Weaver, The Politicsof Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL'Y 371, 373 (1986).
297. Andrew Dugan, CongressionalApproval Rating Languishes at Low Level,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/172859/congressionalGALLUP (July 15,
approval-rating-languishes-low-level.aspx [http://perma.cc/LE9B-5XND].
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it should not be difficult to persuade them that any harm that
comes to disqualified churches can be traced back to Congress,
not the IRS.
To deflect potential public outrage onto Congress, though,
the IRS must clearly and transparently explain the law
underlying the Pulpit Freedom Sunday churches' loss of
exemption, and it must provide some plausible explanation for
why it has begun to enforce a law that, historically, it has not
enforced.
Explaining the law should be relatively easy: the IRS must
explain, in a simple manner, that the Code places certain
conditions on the tax exemption under section 501(c)(3). 298
That part of its statement could follow roughly along these
lines:
Although Congress allows certain charities, including
churches, to be free from the obligation to pay federal
income tax, it conditioned this freedom from taxation on a
charity's meeting certain conditions. One of those conditions
was that charities-again, including churches-not support
or oppose candidates for office. When it drafted the tax law,
Congress decided that an organization that supports or
opposes a candidate for office would not qualify as taxexempt, even if that organization is a church. It delegated to
the IRS both the authority and responsibility to take
exemptions away from organizations that failed the test. It
did not, however, give the IRS authority to decide whether
losing the exemption is the right penalty. As such, the IRS
is obligated to enforce the law passed by Congress and
revoke the tax exemptions of these churches, each of which
endorsed or opposed a candidate for office, and each of
which provided notice to the IRS of what it had done.
As a pragmatic matter, it is unclear whether the IRS
would be willing to explicitly blame Congress. After all,
Congress controls the IRS's budget, and an angry Congress
may be a Congress that would reduce the IRS's budget even

298. By "simply," I mean that the IRS needs to explain in a manner that an
unsophisticated citizen, who does not follow and, for that matter, is utterly
uninterested in tax policy debates, can easily understand. Simplicity may cause a
loss of nuance but, in the end, the campaigning prohibition itself is a relatively
simple, unnuanced rule.
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In spite of the

potential risks, IRS Commissioner John Koskinen has been
publicly critical of the reduction in the IRS budget, and has laid
the blame squarely at the feet of Congress. 30 0 Still, blaming
Congress for providing insufficient funding may be different
than blaming Congress for the IRS's decision to enforce a law,
especially where that enforcement may be unpopular.
Even if the IRS does not want to risk offending Congress
by describing the provenance of the campaigning prohibition, it
should not have to shoulder the public discontent, if any, with
enforcing the campaigning prohibition. If the IRS chose not to
implicate Congress,
others,
including academics
and
journalists, would need to step up. Academics and journalists
have both the means and the obligation to educate the
American public on its legislative system. 30 1 When the IRS
starts revoking the tax exemptions of churches that participate

299. According to the Taxpayer Advocate, between 2010 and 2013, Congress
cut the IRS's budget by almost eight percent. During the same time period,
inflation further eroded the purchasing power of the IRS's reduced funding. NAT'L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: VOL. ONE 20
(2013),
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/
Volume-l.pdf [http://perma.cc/H9X4-BY33].
300. On August 21, 2014, Commissioner Koskinen told the National Society of
Accountants that a proposed $1 billion cut in IRS funding would be "'very serious
if not catastrophic' to the [IRS's] efforts to deliver a smooth filing season." William
Hoffman, Koskinen Warns of House IRS Budget's Impact in 2015, 144 TAX NOTES
919, 919 (2014). He went on to warn Congress that it "cannot continue to reduce
our resources and ask us to do more things. We are no longer going to pretend
that cutting funding makes no difference." More Reductions in IRS Services Likely
Due to Funding Cuts, Koskinen Predicts, 35 FED. TAX WKLY, Aug. 28, 2014, at 1,
http://www.groom.com/media/news/1460 DoldCodeSec_6056&Reporting.pdf
[http://perma.ccl6BXB-8CCF]. Although Commissioner Koskinen's remarks go in
the right direction, they were reported in periodicals aimed toward tax
practitioners and policymakers. To affect the public's perception, the IRS will
have to lay out its obligations to the congressionally-passed prohibition in media
that will reach the average American; those who read tax-specific periodicals are
likely to already understand the IRS's obligation to enforce laws enacted by
Congress.
301. See, e.g., Am. Political Sci. Task Force on Civic Educ. in the 21st Century,
Expanded Articulation Statement: A Call for Reactions and Contributions, 31 PS
636, 636 (1998) ("We believe that we who have chosen to teach politics as our
profession bear major responsibility for addressing the problem [of political
apathy in the United States]."); James Curran et al., Media System, Public
Knowledge and Democracy: A Comparative Study, 24 EUR. J. COMM. 5, 6 (2009)
("In practice, political accountability requires a variety of institutional
arrangements, including ...
a media system that delivers a sufficient supply of
meaningful public affairs information to catch the eye of relatively inattentive
citizens.").
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in Pulpit Freedom Sunday, journalists and academics can
explain Congress's role in creating the shape of the prohibition
in various media, including newspapers and magazines, blogs,
social media, radio, and television. Educating the public on why
the IRS is obligated to revoke the tax exemptions of churches
that support candidates for office would result in a bettereducated electorate, and would provide the IRS with the space
it needs to enforce the law.
C.

Why Now?

Although explaining why the IRS believed it needed to
enforce the campaigning prohibition would be relatively easy,
explaining why it should begin enforcing it now would prove
more difficult. Congress enacted the campaigning prohibition
in 1954.302 Has anything changed over the last sixty years that
could serve as a catalyst for actual large-scale enforcement?
In fact, there have been three significant changes in recent
years that the IRS could point to as justification for moving the
campaigning prohibition higher on its list of priorities. The first
is that Pulpit Freedom Sunday has lowered the search costs to
the IRS. One of the factors an agency must weigh in
determining whether to enforce a law is the best use of its
resources. 3 03 In the past, finding church violators of the
campaigning prohibition and ensuring that the church had, in
fact, endorsed or opposed a candidate for office would have
required the IRS to expend time and resources that it may
have believed did more good used in other ways. Pulpit
Freedom Sunday significantly reduces the costs to the IRS of
enforcing the campaigning prohibition; rather than searching
for violators, the violators come to the IRS and they provide the
IRS with evidence of the violation. As a result, the resource
allocation issue that helps weigh in favor of administrative
discretion is gone.
Second, the public is increasingly aware of the IRS's lack of
enforcement and is pushing back against it.30 4 Most recently,
that manifested itself in the form of a lawsuit by the Freedom
302. See Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical
Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42
B.C. L. REV. 733, 740 (2001).
303.
304.

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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From Religion Foundation against the IRS. The Freedom From
Religion Foundation complained that the IRS had a policy of
not enforcing the campaigning prohibition against churches
while fully enforcing it against other public charities. 305
Because of the pressure imposed by the lawsuit, the IRS has
reportedly agreed to begin investigating church campaigning,
although it will not begin to do so until after the congressional
investigation of its policies regarding Tea-Party-backed socialwelfare groups. 306
In addition to the reduced administrative costs and the
increased pressure, the campaigning prohibition has more
salience since the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens
United.30 7 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court invalidated
federal limitations on the ability of corporations and unions to
use their money in support of or opposition to candidates for
office, finding such limits unconstitutional. 308 As a result, the
Code is the only law standing between churches (and, for that
matter, other public charities) and express campaigning. 3 09
Though there is debate over whether public charities should be
prevented from engaging in campaigning, 3 10 Congress has not
made any change to its policy that public charities may not
engage in political campaigning. And, the only two courts to
hear cases where churches or other religious organizations lost
their exemption have upheld the campaigning prohibition as
305. See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Shulman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 947,
950 (W.D. Wis. 2013). The assertion is not, technically, true: in its 2004 PACI, the
IRS found sixty public charities-both church and non-church organizations-that
had violated the campaigning prohibition. Brunson, supra note 6, at 151. Of those
sixty, fifty-three suffered no penalty, three paid an excise tax, and only four taxexempt organizations (none of which were churches) lost their exemption. Id. In
general, that is, the IRS underenforces the campaigning prohibition. But its
underenforcement against churches differs drastically from its underenforcement
against other tax-exempt organizations. Id.
306. See Tracy, supra note 219.

307.

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

308. Id. at 318-19. It's worth noting that Citizens United was exempt from
taxes under section 501(c)(4). Id. at 404. The decision, then, is not limited in scope
to for-profit corporations; presumably, any blanket limitations on public charities
would also be deemed unconstitutional.
309. See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 14, at 687 ("Absent the [campaigning
prohibition], charities still would have faced a prohibition on some of their
political activities under campaign finance laws, which, until recently, had long
provided that corporations, including charitable corporations, could not spend
money expressly advocating for or against a candidate for public office.").
310. See generally Brunson, supra note 6, at 136-49 (discussing the normative
debate on the contemporary explanations for the campaigning prohibition).
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constitutional. 3 11

The confluence of these three changes-reduced search
costs, increased public outrage and pressure, and more
salience-provides the IRS with a strong explanation for why it
would start enforcing the campaigning prohibition against
churches now, in spite of its long history of non-enforcement.
Although the campaigning prohibition has not changed, the
legal and social context in which it finds itself has, and those
changes merit a new focus on enforcement.
CONCLUSION

Without the intervention of the courts, the debate over the
constitutionality of the campaigning prohibition, as applied to
churches, will remain purely academic: interesting and
valuable but ultimately inconclusive. Years of scholarship and
activism have neither definitively resolved the question nor
found a workaround that allows us to determine the
constitutionality of the campaigning prohibition without
judicial intervention. Moreover, there is no scholarly silver
bullet out there that will appear someday in the future. This
does not mean that the scholarship and the debate have no
value. They have helped, and will continue to help, crystalize
the policies underlying and the consequences of the
campaigning prohibition.
Still, in spite of the value of the debate, we must ultimately
resolve the question of the prohibition's constitutionality. Even
unenforced, the campaigning prohibition looms large in the
mind of the public and in constraining (or not) the actions of
churches. Even churches that are willing to flout the
prohibition remain acutely aware that the prohibition exists
and that they are, in fact, violating it.3 12 Congress will continue
311. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
("That the Church cannot use its tax-free dollars to fund such a PAC
unquestionably passes constitutional muster."); Christian Echoes Nat'1 Ministry
v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856-57 (10th Cir. 1972) ("We hold that the
[campaigning] limitations imposed by Congress in Section 501(c)(3) are
constitutionally valid.").
312. For example, during 2014's Pulpit Freedom Sunday, Pastor Matthew
Schlesinger of San Diego's Grace Church preached on the history of church
involvement in politics and decried the current limitations on church politicking.
SpeakUpChurch, Matthew Schlesinger's Pulpit Freedom Sunday Sermon,
YOuTUBE, (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ADtVqlabcBg
[https://perma.cclW73Z-L4M9]. Interestingly enough, though, he appears to
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to leave the prohibition alone, for both political and pragmatic
reasons. It currently appears content to use the campaigning
prohibition as a weapon against the IRS when it wants a
scapegoat for its tax policies. But even if Congress sincerely
wanted to fix the problem, the constitutionality of penalizing
churches for supporting candidates for office will have an
outsize effect on what, if anything, Congress can do.
Realistically, the only way this uneasy-and unhealthyequilibrium can end is to allow churches to have their day in
court. And the only way churches can put the question in front
of the courts is if the IRS enforces the law and revokes their tax
exemptions for violating the campaigning prohibition. The
IRS's reticence to do so is understandable given its long history
of ignoring such violations; the severity of the penalty; and the
cost that litigation would entail, balanced against the limited
revenue that such a revocation would likely provide. Still, the
IRS has both the duty and the goal of enforcing and ensuring
compliance with the tax law. 3 13 Doing so not only helps create a
culture of compliance, but it "gives taxpayers confidence in the
tax administration system." 3 14
Only the IRS can permit the courts to adjudicate whether
the campaigning prohibition is constitutional. The IRS can do
so in a way that does not cause itself reputational harm,
educating both the public and churches themselves about the
prohibition, about its relevance, and about the IRS's duty to
enforce the law as Congress enacted it. The IRS can further
protect itself from blowback by providing advanced notice to
churches that it will begin enforcing the prohibition and by
selecting the churches it audits mechanically, in a manner that
prevents its decisions from exhibiting any ideological valence.
If the IRS carefully selects the churches and explains its
actions, the uncertainty over the campaigning prohibition can
misunderstand the campaigning prohibition as including all political speech, or
else he is unwilling to violate the campaigning prohibition. In either event, his
sermon, while asserting the right of pastors to participate in the political world,
does not endorse or oppose a candidate for office and, as a result, would not cause
Grace Church to lose its tax exemption.
313. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STRATEGIC PLAN FY2014-2017 at 16 (2014),
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3744.pdf [http://perma.cc/XBN5-F8SK] ("Our second and
equally important goal is to effectively enforce the tax law to ensure compliance
with tax responsibilities and combat fraud.").
314. I.R.S. OVERSIGHT BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2011 at 32 (2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/IRSOB/reports/Documents/IRSOB%2OAnnual%2OReport
%202011.pdf [http://perma.cclUJ3A-N6N5].
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end. The courts will find the prohibition either constitutional or
unconstitutional. If it is unconstitutional, the IRS can (and in
fact must) stop enforcing it. If it is constitutional, the IRS can
and should expand its enforcement of the prohibition.
Ultimately, if Congress dislikes the IRS's revocations of
churches' tax exemptions, a court decision will provide it with
incentive to change the penalty or change the prohibition. All
this, however, rests on the IRS exercising its discretion and
affirmatively deciding to enforce the campaigning prohibition
as enacted in the Code. Otherwise, the campaigning prohibition
will continue to impede risk-averse churches while allowing
risk-tolerant churches broad freedom and discretion, to the
detriment of both church and the tax law at large.

